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set of preference profiles for which equilibrium is unique. Based on this characteriza-
tion, I establish that a weak notion of present bias—implied, e.g., by any hyperbolic
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increasing offers.
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1 Introduction
In the absence of irrevocable commitments, time is the prime variable of bargaining agree-
ments: the parties may agree not only now or never, but also sooner or later. The question
of how the parties’ time preferences govern bargaining outcomes lies at the heart of modern
bargaining theory (Ståhl, 1972; Rubinstein, 1982). Under the traditional assumption of ex-
ponential discounting (ED), their impatience drives the parties towards a sharply predictable
immediate agreement, which is efficient. Beyond this special case, a full understanding of
the fundamental role of time preferences in bargaining has remained elusive, however. Since
any violation of ED implies dynamic inconsistency, standard techniques for characterizing
equilibrium fail to be applicable. While bargaining theory has turned towards informational
frictions to explain inefficient delay, it has remained an open question whether time pref-
erences alone might already impose a friction on the parties’ ability to reach agreement
immediately, when they are dynamically inconsistent.1
This paper provides a general analytic framework for the canonical Rubinstein (1982)
bargaining model: I derive a simple sufficient off-path “punishment” structure, supporting
all equilibrium behavior, that renders arbitrarily history-dependent strategies analytically
tractable under only minimal restrictions on time preferences and dynamic inconsistency.
The resulting equilibrium characterization puts the aforementioned influential conclusions
from ED on a solid basis: it shows that they extend to all time preferences satisfying a weak
notion of present bias, which covers all established models of dynamic inconsistency. The
characterization further reveals that, more generally, the extension to dynamic inconsistency
is non-trivial, and changes in relative impatience can matter in equilibrium: a novel kind of
equilibrium delay emerges when at least one party exhibits instead a near-future bias.
I consider any profile of time preferences such that a party i evaluates delayed agreements
with a continuous utility function Ui (xi, t) and assume only that she prefers a greater surplus
share xi, holding the delay t constant, and a shorter delay t, holding her surplus share
xi > 0 constant. This covers all existing models of time preferences, with ED as the only
special case for which preferences are dynamically consistent (Halevy, 2015). The standard
solution technique for characterizing equilibrium under ED exploits the game’s stationarity
via recursions on the parties’ extreme continuation values (see Shaked and Sutton, 1984).
Under dynamic inconsistency, however, the possibility of multiple and delayed equilibrium
agreements means that a party may not rank these agreements the same way across different
points in time, hence continuation values do not encode sufficient information to determine
1Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (2015) give a recent account of the literature on bargaining under incom-
plete information; see, however, also Yildiz (2011). Another line of research has examined variations of the
bargaining protocol (e.g., Muthoo, 1990), or even endogenized it (see Perry and Reny, 1993; Sákovics, 1993).
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present values.2 As a consequence, the recursion breaks down, and it is not known what
additional information regarding the underlying set of continuation agreements would be
required or how to obtain it.
To overcome this problem I directly analyze the off-path punishments (continuation equi-
libria, upon rejection) that support all equilibrium play, i.e. optimal penal codes (cf. Abreu,
1988). I show it is sufficient to consider simple penal codes described by four “extreme”
outcomes. These, jointly, define four punishments such that the exact same punishment is
used to deter any deviation by a given player in a given role (hence four), independent of the
deviation’s history; e.g., any deviation by player 1 as the proposer triggers the exact same
continuation equilibrium (upon rejection), on as well as off the path.3 This simplified struc-
ture renders equilibrium analysis tractable for general time preferences; e.g., it reveals that
the crucial piece of information required for recursion on a player’s extreme (continuation)
values is the extreme/maximal (continuation) delay, which is itself jointly determined with
the players’ extreme values by the optimal punishments. Moreover, it allows me to exploit
a fixed-point property of any optimal simple penal code—that each of its four outcomes is
extreme among all those they jointly support—to arrive at the paper’s core results: a full
characterization of both (i) the set of equilibrium outcomes for any given preference profile,
and (ii) the set of preference profiles that imply a unique equilibrium.
While the strategic implications of dynamic inconsistency in bargaining can be subtle, for
the purposes of applied work the characterization bears the good news that the conclusions
from ED are confirmed. Under standard concavity assumptions on preferences concerning
the surplus share, a weak notion of present bias (to be satisfied by both parties) turns out
sufficient for equilibrium to be unique. In this case equilibrium is also stationary and implies
an immediate agreement that depends only on the parties’ attitudes to a single (first) period
of delay.4 The notion of present bias identified here means that a decision maker finds a given
delay most costly when it concerns an otherwise immediate reward, as opposed to further
delaying a future reward. This property is readily testable empirically and easily checked
for any given model of time preferences; in particular, any discounting that is hyperbolic
(Chung and Herrnstein, 1967; Ainslie, 1975) or quasi-hyperbolic (Phelps and Pollak, 1968;
2As solution concept I use the natural two-player version of multiple-selves equilibrium, which is equivalent
to subgame perfection under ED (cf. Chade, Prokopovych, and Smith, 2008).
3Mailath, Nocke, and White (2015) present related examples of repeated sequential games where no
simple penal code is optimal due to incentive trade-offs between within-round and continuation punishment.
By contrast, here a single round’s play determines all payoffs.
4The curvatures of the parties’ utilities in the surplus share govern stationary equilibrium, and they are
essentially orthogonal to dynamic (in-)consistency. Even under ED there are multiple stationary equilibria if
utilities are sufficiently convex in the surplus share. Under non-separability there is no atemporal utility from
surplus—e.g., see the magnitude-effects model advanced by Noor (2011)—and this curvature may become
more convex for delayed shares, which may also produce such multiplicity (section 5.2 has details).
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Laibson, 1997) satisfies it. Thus this paper equips applied work with a stragegically founded
bargaining solution for these commonly considered preferences. The solution is then not
only sharp and simple, with straightforward comparative statics, but—by virtue of the more
general sufficiency result given present bias—also robust to misspecification of the parties’
attitudes to delay beyond a single period.
Conversely, a theoretically novel kind of equilibrium delay arises when at least one of
the two parties has instead a near-future bias. Such a decision maker finds delaying a near-
future reward by a given amount of time more costly than delaying an immediate one. For
instance, any discounting function that is initially concave, hence falling steepest not at zero
but at some positive delay, implies this property (e.g., Ebert and Prelec, 2007; Bleichrodt,
Rohde, and Wakker, 2009). In contrast to present bias, a party with a near-future bias
does not exert immediate control over the delay she finds most costly. The price that her
current self is willing to pay to avoid a near-future delay is excessive to her near-future self,
to whom that same delay is immediate; i.e., she subsequently becomes more patient. This
makes delay self-enforcing: a delay off the path—as a threat that commands a “self-control
premium” for immediate agreement—supports itself on the path.5 Moreover, any such delay
is supported as a gradual agreement, where the parties gradually increase their offers over the
course of the bargaining. This delay-result under near-future bias clarifies the importance
of present bias for reaching immediate agreement, and it informs future theoretical work
with dynamically inconsistent preferences by showing how changes in relative impatience
can matter in bargaining.
Related Literature. There exists little prior work on bargaining that analyzes dynami-
cally inconsistent time preferences: Burgos, Grant, and Kajii (2002a); Akin (2007); Ok and
Masatlioglu (2007); Noor (2011).6 All of these papers restrict attention to stationary strate-
gies, however, thus severely limiting the potential for dynamic inconsistency to matter.7 This
paper studies a general class of preferences that covers all of those studied previously and at
the same time generalizes the analysis to arbitrarily history-dependent strategies.
Other closely related work investigates non-stationary time preferences that are, however,
dynamically consistent (Binmore, 1987; Rusinowska, 2004; Pan, Webb, and Zank, 2015);
e.g., a player may apply different discount rates to June 30, 2016, and July 1, 2016, but
5Rather than relying on stationary equilibrium off the path, as in prior constructions (Avery and Zemsky,
1994), such delay equilibria are non-stationary in every subgame.
6Burgos et al. (2002a) study bargaining with breakdown risk for certain non-expected-utility preferences;
Akin (2007) also investigates naïveté and learning by quasi-hyperbolic discounters.
7The sole exception is Lu (2016) who studies bargaining by sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic discounters.
In his model bargaining is over an infinite stream of cakes rather than a single one, however, so agreements
are infinite consumption commitments.
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independent of the delay to these dates.8 I abstract from such exogenous effects of time on
the players’ preferences, which would also appear negligible under frequent offers; instead,
the discount rate for any given period may depend only on the delay to this period, not
on its absolute time. Moreover, I maintain that preferences are history-independent; i.e.,
unlike in Fershtman and Seidmann (1993), and Li (2007), where the best past offer acts as
a “reference point”, the parties are consequentialist, caring only about the eventual surplus
division and its delay, not how agreement is reached.
Regarding the power of history-dependent strategies in generating delay, also the work
that endogenizes the timing of offers, starting with Perry and Reny (1993) and Sákovics
(1993), as well as that on “negotiation” by Busch and Wen (1995) where, as long as parties fail
to agree, they repeatedly play a disagreement game, share similarities. The underlying reason
for why history-dependent strategies are powerful here—namely, dynamic inconsistency—is
fundamentally different, however.
Finally, this paper contributes to the wider literature that explores the bargaining im-
plications of relaxing certain hitherto standard but “unrealistic” (or extreme) assumptions
about the players. Whereas this model’s only non-standard feature is dynamically inconsis-
tent preferences, relaxing ED, most of the recent literature has been concerned with non-
standard beliefs, relaxing common knowledge of the bargaining protocol or of players’ ratio-
nality (e.g., Yildiz, 2011; Friedenberg, 2016).
Outline. After introducing the formal model in section 2, section 3 already describes the
main results of this paper for the special case where players maximize their discounted share
of the surplus for arbitrary discounting; this generalizes the most widely used version of the
Rubinstein (1982) model. Section 4 then contains the full-fledged equilibrium characteriza-
tion, and I further investigate equilibrium uniqueness and multiplicity/delay in section 5.
Finally, I offer some concluding remarks in section 6. All formal proofs (as well as additional
notation) are found in appendix A; appendix B contains supplementary material.
2 Bargaining and Time Preferences
2.1 Bargaining Protocol, Histories and Strategies
I follow Rubinstein (1982) exactly with regards to the bargaining protocol of (possibly in-
definitely) alternating offers. There are two players {1, 2} ≡ I, who bargain over a perfectly
8This is similar to time-varying surplus as in Coles and Muthoo (2003); see also Merlo and Wilson (1995)
and Cripps (1998), who investigate Markovian surplus processes. All of these models maintain dynamic
consistency of preferences; indeed, delay typically occurs only when efficient.
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divisible surplus of (normalized) size one. Throughout the paper, whenever i ∈ I denotes
one player, j ≡ 3 − i denotes the other. In round n ∈ N, player P (n) proposes a surplus
division x ∈
{
(x1, x2) ∈ R2+|x1 + x2 = 1
}
≡ X to her opponent R (n) (equivalently, P (n)
offers R (n) share xR(n)), who then responds by either accepting or rejecting the proposal.
If it is accepted, the game ends with agreement on x; otherwise, one period of time elapses
until the subsequent round n + 1, where the roles of proposer and respondent are reversed,
so P (n + 1) = R (n). This process of alternating offers begins with player 1’s proposal, i.e.
P (1) = 1, and continues until there is agreement, possibly without ever terminating.
A history of play to the beginning of round n ∈ N is a sequence of n−1 rejected proposals
hn−1 ∈ Xn−1, where X0 ≡ {∅}; throughout, “history” always refers to such a beginning-of-
round history. A strategy σi of a player i assigns to every possible such history hn−1 an
available action: if i = P (n), then σi (hn−1) specifies a proposal x ∈ X, and if i = R (n),
then it specifies for every possible proposal whether she accepts or rejects it; without loss
of generality, I identify this response rule σR(n) (hn−1) with the set of accepted proposals
Y ∈ P (X). If i’s response rule Y has x ∈ Y ⇔ xi ≥ q, I say that i accepts with threshold q.
A strategy σi is stationary if it specifies the same proposal x and response rule Y , irrespective




, and its prescribed
play after history hn−1 is σ (hn−1) ≡
(
σP (n) (hn−1) , σR(n) (hn−1)
)
.
2.2 Outcomes and (Time) Preferences
If the players agree on division x with a delay of t periods, I call the outcome (x, t), and if
they perpetually fail to agree, I call it ((0, 0) , ∞). Thus defined in terms of relative time
(delay), the set of possible outcomes is the same after any history. A player i’s preferences
are formulated over the set Ai ≡ [0, 1] × T , for T ≡ N0 ∪ {∞}, of i’s personal outcomes that
are her own share and the delay of agreement.
Assumption 1. In any round n, a player i’s preferences over personal outcomes are repre-
sented by the same utility function Ui : Ai → R, satisfying the following properties:
1. Continuity: {a ∈ Ai|Ui (a) ≥ k} and {a ∈ Ai|Ui (a) ≤ k} are closed for all k ∈ R;9
2. Desirability: q < q′ implies Ui (q, t) < Ui (q′, t) for all t;10
9Closedness refers to the product topology on Ai, where [0, 1] and T are endowed with the relative
standard and discrete topologies, respectively.
10Absent separability, desirability cannot be formulated independent of the time dimension; specifically,
(2.) rules out that a player be entirely indifferent regarding her share once delay gets “too long”. A
slight generalization can accommodate such preferences as well, however, without requiring a single change
in the results or proofs presented: replace property (2.) with “for any t ∈ T , either Ui is constant on
[0, 1] × {t′ ∈ T |t′ ≥ t} or q < q′ implies Ui (q, t) < Ui (q′, t).”
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3. Impatience:
(a) t > t′ implies Ui (q, t) ≤ Ui (q, t′) for all q,
(b) q > 0 implies Ui (q, 0) > Ui (q, 1), and




for all q and all t ≥ t̂.
Continuity (1.) is a standard technical assumption, and desirability (2.) defines the con-
flict of interest in the bargaining problem. Property (3.) corresponds to a general notion
of impatience regarding agreement: for any given division of the surplus, players do not
prefer later over sooner agreement (3.a), if a division yields them a positive share they pre-
fer immediate agreement over delayed agreement (3.b), and whenever they do not become
“overwhelmingly” impatient for delay approaching infinity (the standard case guaranteeing
“continuity at infinity”), they must be impatient only regarding a finite horizon (3.c). In
what follows, by “impatience” I refer only to the two properties (3.ab). The role of property
(3.c) is technical: together with continuity, it guarantees existence of a “worst” equilibrium,
and I point out explicitly where it is used.
Assumption 1 covers all models of time preferences with impatience put forward in the
literature (see Manzini and Mariotti, 2009).11 It generalizes the most widely studied class of
separable time preferences (i.e., discounted utility) axiomatized by Fishburn and Rubinstein
(1982, thm. 1), where Ui (q, t) = d (t) ·u (q) with d (·) a decreasing “discounting” function, to
also cover various non-separable time preferences such as those proposed by Benhabib, Bisin,
and Schotter (2010) or Noor (2011).12 An instantaneous utility function can nonetheless be
defined by ui (q) ≡ Ui (q, 0), and it is continuous and increasing.
Halevy (2015, prop. 4) shows that a player’s preferences satisfying assumption 1 are
dynamically consistent if and only if they satisfy the stationarity axiom. The latter requires
that the preference over two outcomes (q, t) and (q′, t′) depend only on their relative delay:
Ui (q, t) ≥ Ui (q′, t′) if and only if Ui (q, t + τ) ≥ Ui (q′, t′ + τ) for any τ ∈ T ; this would here
11The focus of this paper is on time preferences in the usual broad sense of preferences over delayed
rewards, which have been extensively researched empirically. However, assumption 1 can also (alternatively
or additionally) accommodate costs that are proper to the bargaining activity; e.g., with Ui (q, t) = q − c (t)
for c (·) increasing, party i would rather quit bargaining altogether if she expected it to take some time but
eventually result only in a very small payoff (e.g., consider q = 0).
12Ok and Masatlioglu (2007) propose a theory of relative discounting that relaxes transitivity for compar-
isons across three different delays, thus capturing also sub-additive discounting (Read, 2001) and similarity-
based choice (Rubinstein, 2003). Within the simplified structure of equilibria established below, these failures
of transitivity play no role, however. Hence, the characterizaton of equilibrium outcomes also covers these
“preferences” (formally, in their notation, let d (t) ≡ η (0, t)).
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yield ED, where Ui (q, t) = δt · u (q) (Fishburn and Rubinstein, 1982, thm. 2). With the
exception of ED, all time preferences studied here are therefore dynamically inconsistent.
2.3 Equilibrium Concept
I abstract from informational frictions by assuming that the players’ preferences are common
knowledge. In the terminology coined by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), players are then
fully “sophisticated” about their own as well as their opponent’s dynamic inconsistency.
The equilibrium concept has to incorporate how intertemporal conflict within a player’s own
preferences is resolved. In single-person decision problems, the standard solution concept for
such sophisticated decision makers is that of Strotz-Pollak equilibrium (Strotz, 1956; Pollak,
1968), also known as multiple-selves equilibrium (Piccione and Rubinstein, 1997); it is the
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of an auxiliary game in which the decision-maker
at any point in time is a distinct non-cooperative player. Technically, one then looks for
strategy profiles that are robust to one-stage deviations, and this formalizes the presumption
that a decision-maker cannot internally commit to future behavior.
The equilibrium notion employed here is the natural extension of this concept to strategic
interaction by multiple decision-makers (cf. Chade et al., 2008). To facilitate its definition,
let zh
n−1
i (x, Y |σ) denote the personal outcome of player i, as of round n, that obtains if,
following history hn−1, P (n) proposes x, R (n) uses response rule Y , and in case there is
no agreement, i.e. x /∈ Y , both players subsequently adhere to strategy profile σ; e.g., if
σP (n+1) (hn−1, x) = x′ ∈ σR(n+1) (hn−1, x), then zh
n−1
i (x, Y |σ) equals (xi, 0) whenever x ∈ Y ,
and (x′i, 1) otherwise; accordingly, z
hn−1,x
i (σ (h
n−1, x)| σ) = (x′i, 0).
Definition 1. A strategy profile σ is a multiple-selves equilibrium (“equilibrium”) if,













































R(n) (x, Y | σ)
)
.
Observe that this indeed defines the SPNE of the auxiliary game where the set of players
is taken to be I × N. The well-known one-stage deviation principle (e.g., Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1991, thm. 4.2) says that it coincides with SPNE of the actual game played by I
whenever both players’ preferences satisfy ED; hence this paper’s model contains that of
Rubinstein (1982) as a special case.13
13As in Rubinstein (1982), I consider only pure strategies—a common restriction in this literature, even
in models with inherent risk (e.g., Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky, 1986; Merlo and Wilson, 1995).
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2.4 Preliminaries
A central property for the analysis of this game is its stationarity: conditional on failure to
agree, the game repeats itself every two rounds. Hence, ignoring history, all subgames begin-
ning with the very same player i’s proposal are identical and, in particular, have the same
equilibria; denote this game by Gi. The above defines G1; the sole modification of specifying
player 2 as the initial proposer, P (1) = 2, defines game G2. To distinguish absolute and
relative time, throughout, I use n for rounds of a given bargaining game (absolute time) and
t for delays to a given agreement (relative time).
Let then A∗i ⊆ Ai be the set of player i’s personal outcomes that are equilibrium outcomes
in Gi. The equilibrium characterization will center on a player i’s minimal proposer value
v∗i and minimal rejection value w
∗
i , as well as the supremal delay t
∗
i in Gi, given by:
v∗i ≡ min {Ui (q, t) | (q, t) ∈ A
∗
i }
w∗i ≡ min {Ui (q, t + 1) | (q, t) ∈ A
∗
i }
t∗i ≡ sup {t ∈ T |∃q ∈ [0, 1] , (q, t) ∈ A
∗
i } .
3 The Case of Discounted Shares
The most widely used version of the Rubinstein (1982) model has the bargainers maximize
their exponentionally discounted surplus share. To make the key results of this paper quickly
accessible, this section illustrates them for the generalization of this case only in terms of dis-
counting; in fact, under the following common strengthening of assumption 1 it summarizes
all information necessary to apply the results in either theoretical or empirical work.
Assumption 2. In any round n, a player i’s preferences over personal outcomes are repre-
sented by the same utility function Ui : Ai → R such that







where (i) 0 < δi (s) < 1 for any positive s, and (ii) limt→∞
∏t
s=1 δi (s) = 0.
14
A player i’s total discount factor for a delay of t periods, denoted di (t), is the product
∏t
s=1 δi (s) of the intermittent per-period discount factors. Indifference between two outcomes
Permitting randomization devices, while unlikely to enlarge the set of equilibrium outcomes (cf. Binmore,
1987), would come at the cost of augmenting the domain of preferences by risk, however, adding a layer of
cardinality.
14I follow the convention that the empty product for t = 0 equals one.
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(q, t − 1) and (q′, t) means that q = δi (t) · q′, so unless discounting is constant—δi (·) = δi,
i.e. ED—it is dynamically inconsistent.
The burden of deciding about delay in bargaining is ultimately on the player responding
to an offer. Regardless of its exact form, the respondent’s impatience bestows a strategic
advantage upon the proposing player, guaranteeing the latter a minimal rent. In particular,
perpetual disagreement can therefore not be an equilibrium outcome.
Given the bargainers eventually agree, it is straightforward to characterize stationary
equilibrium and establish equilibrium existence: starting from agreement on division x when
player i makes an offer, two rounds of backwards induction must lead to the same agree-
ment. Under assumption 2 there exists a unique such agreement, hence a unique stationary
equilibrium: i always proposes the same division x and accepts with the same threshold
yi—equal to j’s offer—such that
xi = 1 − δj (1) · (1 − yi) and yi = δi (1) · xi. (1)
Stationary equilibrium assumes that bargainers are unresponsive to their opponent’s past
behavior (as well as their own). Under this restriction, each party’s decision problem boils
down to a two-period consideration, hence dynamic inconsistency cannot unfold and there is
immediate agreement after any history as under ED. Consider then the following example,
in which parties may condition their bargaining on history.
Example 1. Od (player 1) and Eve (player 2) bargain over how to “split a dollar”. Their
preferences satisfy assumption 2, where it is only specified that both discount a first period
of delay with common factor δi (1) = δ, and that Od discounts a second period of delay with
factor δ1 (2) = γδ for γ < 1. (It is instructive to think first of δ ≈ 1 and γ ≈ 0.) Since
δ1 (2) < δ1 (1), Od is dynamically inconsistent with a “near-future bias”: e.g., facing the
prospect of agreement on x in two periods, he would prefer agreeing instead next period for
any share q with γδx1 < q, but in this next period reverse his preference if also q < δx1.
(ED would require γ = 1, hence δ1 (2) = δ1 (1).)
Figure 1 describes equilibrium strategies for (once) delayed agreement on a given contin-








continuation according to the unique stationary equilibrium. Delay requires a supporting
off-path threat that prevents Od from exploiting his proposer advantage. (If the second-
round had agreement on z regardless of first-round play, Od could simply offer Eve her (then
unique) rejection value δz2—which she had no reason to reject—and thus appropriate the
full efficiency gain from immediate rather than delayed agreement.) This threat is alterna-
tive second-round agreement y (shaded green), which is more favorable to Eve than z and
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ROUND 1








→ agree on z
P1’s offer
> δz2
P2 offers y1 = γδ
2z1
P1 threshold γδ2z1
→ agree on y
“Restart”: Round 3 = Round 1 (whatever P2’s offer)
Figure 1: Delay equilibrium in example 1 (assuming δy2 ≥ 1 − δz1). The equilibrium path
uses solid lines/borders, and dashed ones indicate supporting off-path behavior.
played in case Od initially offered Eve a share in excess of δz2. Hence, Eve initially accepts
with threshold δy2, and for 1 − δy2 ≤ δz1 initial proposer Od prefers the delayed z over any
available immediate agreement; he therefore chooses his initial offer x2 so low (e.g., zero)
that Eve in turn prefers the delayed z over acceptance, x2 ≤ δz2.
Of course, threat y such that 1 − δy2 ≤ δz1 (implying y2 > z2) must be credible. It is
Od’s near-future bias that lends credibility to it: the strategies in figure 1 specify that any
failure to agree when Eve makes her offer off-path (shaded green) leads to continuation play
identical to that from round 1, with once delayed agreement on z. Od’s rejection would
therefore always entail two periods of delay and have value γδ2z1, enabling proposer Eve
to appropriate the full efficiency gain from immediate agreement, with her share equal to
y2 = 1 − γδ2z1. For a sufficiently strong bias of Od (sufficiently low γ), y satisfies the
equilibrium condition 1 − δy2 ≤ δz1, and the delayed agreement on z produces its own
supporting threat. Such values of γ exist for any z with z1 ≥ 1−δδ ; as δ → 1, this means any
z (in particular the stationary continuation equilibrium). Moreover, regardless of how small
Od’s bias is (γ close to one), the strategies then form an equilibrium for sufficiently frequent
offers (δ large enough).
Two points are worth emphasizing about this example. (It is readily extended to exhibit
also longer delays; see example 3 below.) First, for delay to occur it suffices that the proposer
(Od) makes an unacceptably low offer. Though inefficient, he may well do so if he expects
any attempt at compromise (Pareto-improvement) to be rejected as well. The intuitive
difference between an “unambiguously” low and a compromise offer is, however, that the
latter’s rejection would allow the respondent (Eve) to credibly adopt an uncompromising
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stance. It is this off-path belief that rationalizes the low offer that eschews the respondent’s
such opportunity.
Second, near-future bias provides a foundation for this belief, hence delay. In contrast
to prior explanations, which depended on multiple stationary equilibria (Avery and Zemsky,
1994), this dynamic inconsistency means delay can be “self-enforcing”: any delay at the
proposer stage comes with the threat of one additional (future) delay at the respondent stage
(see Od in round 2 off-path, shaded green); under near-future bias this additional delay can be
so costly (γ low enough) as to rationalize an agreement that in turn supports unacceptable
offers—hence delay—at the proposer stage. To outweigh the proposer advantage, which
ensures a minimal rent to the proposer over her worst threat, the bias needs to be sufficiently
strong. As offers become frequent, this rent vanishes, however, and delay equilibria arise for
arbitrarily small such biases.
Given the possibility of equilibrium delay, standard recursive arguments fail in character-
izing equilibrium. When preferences are dynamically inconsistent, knowledge of a player’s
continuation value is insufficient to determine her rejection value, which is the strategically
relevant one. In particular, the relationship w∗i = δi (1) · v
∗
i between i’s minimal (continua-
tion) value v∗i as proposer and i’s minimal (rejection) value w
∗
i as respondent generally holds
true only when no equilibrium of Gi has delay (cf. Shaked and Sutton, 1984).
To circumvent this problem, I directly investigate the structure of optimal punishments
delivering the minimal values v∗i and w
∗
i . The main insight towards characterizing equilibrium
is that, given any equilibrium delay t, a proposing player is indifferent between her least
preferred immediate equilibrium agreement and her least preferred equilibrium agreement
with that delay t; both yield proposer i her minimal value v∗i . This indifference property
allows to solve for player i’s minimal values (v∗i , w
∗
i ) given the maximal delay t
∗
i in game Gi:
letting ∆i (t) ≡ inf {δi (s) |s ∈ T, 0 < s ≤ t} denote player i’s minimal per-period discount
factor over horizon t,
v∗i = 1 − δj (1) · (1 − w
∗
i ) and w
∗
i = ∆i (t
∗
i + 1) · v
∗
i . (2)
Proposer i cannot do worse than by making the smallest offer that respondent j would never
refuse, j’s maximal rejection value. This value obtains when j would subsequently receive
her maximal share 1−w∗i with least delay—i.e., immediately following rejection—and equals
δj (1) · (1 − w∗i ). For the second equation in (2) suppose an equilibrium of game Gi with
delay t. From the indifference property, initial proposer i’s worst such equilibrium has her
share equal to 1
di(t)
· v∗i , and this implies rejection value
di(t+1)
di(t)
· v∗i ≡ δi (t + 1) · v
∗
i for i as the
respondent prior to Gi. This rejection value is minimal whenever δi (t + 1) is so, meaning
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that the one additional delay—the t + 1-th period—that i’s rejection would entail is most
costly (over t ≤ t∗i ).
Conversely, the maximal delay t∗i in game Gi is uniquely determined by the minimal
proposer values v∗i and v
∗
j , as they capture the players’ incentives, as proposer, to make an
unacceptable offer rather than settle for the worst immediate agreement:
t∗i = sup
{
t ∈ T |κi
(

















The function κi (t, vi, vj) measures the incentive cost of delay t in game Gi: if initial proposer
i could obtain up to value vi by making an accepted offer rather than incurring delay t, she
requires at least the share vi
di(t)
with this delay in order not to do so; similarly, player j’s
share must be at least vj
dj(t−1)
, since when she gets to propose the first time along the path,
the delay would be t−1. As the delay shrinks, these shares become smaller, so the above two
incentive constraints are not only necessary but sufficient. They can be satisfied under some
feasible division if and only if κi (t, vi, vj) ≤ 1. When the proposer values are minimal, so is
the incentive cost, and an equilibrium with delay t exists as long as this minimal incentive
cost does not exceed the total available surplus (3).




i )i∈I are jointly determined by the system of six equations in (2)
and (3), to which they are the unique extreme solution: if (vi, wi, ti)i∈I is any solution, then
v∗i ≤ vi, w
∗
i ≤ wi and t
∗
i ≥ ti for both i. They fully characterize equilibrium: agreement on
division x with delay t is an equilibrium outcome of game Gi if and only if














The set of divisions that players might agree upon is monotonically shrinking with the
delay, where the bounds trace the players’ time preferences according to the aforementioned
indifference property.
The characterization yields several further insights. First, equilibrium is unique if and
only if there is a unique solution to the system of equations. Indeed, the unique stationary
equilibrium values in (1), together with t∗1 = t
∗
2 = 0, always form a solution. It is then
immediate from (2) that a weak manifestation of present bias, namely δi (1) ≤ δi (s) for
all s ≥ 1, is sufficient for uniqueness (then ∆i (∞) = δi (1), and hence w∗i = δi (1) · v
∗
i ):
if both parties find the first period of delay that rejection always entails most costly, then
the proposer advantage is only reinforced and delay cannot be self-enforcing. Thus the
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uniqueness under ED extends to any form of present bias, in particular any quasi-hyperbolic
or hyperbolic discounting.
A future bias of at least one of the bargainers is therefore necessary for equilibrium delay.
When this bias concerns the relatively near future—relative referring to the players’ overall
impatience that drives the incentive cost in (3)—then it is sufficient (e.g., under frequent
offers). The resulting equilibrium set has two noteworthy features in this case: i) gradual
agreement, and ii) immediate equal division under symmetry.
First, any delayed agreement is reached through gradual agreement, where, as bargaining
unfolds, each party’s “concessions” (offers as proposer, and maximum accepted/conceded
opponent shares as respondent) increase towards that of the eventual agreement (see section
5.2.1 for a formal definition). The closer in time is the agreement, the smaller is the set of
Pareto-improvements, hence ever higher concessions are consistent with delay. For instance,
in example 1’s delay equilibrium, Od’s concessions are x2 and z2, and Eve’s are 1 − δy2 and
z1; both sequences are increasing.
Second, if both players’ preferences are symmetric, existence of a delay equilibrium always
implies a credible threat such that the minimal proposer value/share is less than one half;
κi (1, v∗, v∗) ≤ 1 implies v∗ < 12 . At the same time, due to the proposer advantage, there
is then also an equilibrium in which the proposer obtains a value/share greater than one
half (e.g., the symmetric stationary equilibrium), hence this threat supports an immediate
equal split.15 In example 1 (which permits symmetry) the equilibrium condition for delayed
agreement when z is the stationary equilibrium division implies 1 − δy2 < 12 , and immediate
agreement on an equal division can be supported by only slightly modified threats: if round
2 is reached following an offer of less than one half, they agree on y, otherwise on z.
4 Equilibrium for General Time Preferences
The previous section has outlined the fundamental strategic considerations that may emerge
in bargaining when the parties discount their shares in a dynamically inconsistent man-
ner. I now turn to the rigorous analysis of the general model, which will clarify how the
above intuition is established for general time preferences. As already indicated, I allow
for arbitrarily history-dependent strategies to provide a complete account of the strategic
considerations that arise under dynamic inconsistency. The otherwise common assumption
of stationary strategies would conflict with this objective, because it strongly restricts the
parties’ beliefs a priori: however systematically player i has deviated from a given stationary
15More generally, for any t < t∗, an equal division with t periods of delay is an equilibrium outcome; also,
whenever an equal split is an equilibrium agreement for some delay t, so is an immediate equal split.
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strategy in the past, it restricts the other to still believing that i will comply with it (see
Rubinstein, 1991, p. 912). This point is of special importance here due to the additional
presence of intra-personal conflict (dynamic inconsistency). First, a player’s beliefs about
her own future behavior are as central as those regarding the opponent, as she may have rea-
son to “doubt herself”. Second, the potential of stationary strategies for creating/exploiting
dynamic preference reversals is severely limited.
The combination of dynamically inconsistent preferences with the possibility of multiple
equilibria and delay (through history-dependent strategies) poses an analytical challenge,
however.16 Standard recursive techniques (see Shaked and Sutton, 1984) fail to be applicable,
because a player’s continuation value alone provides insufficient information to pin down a
unique rejection value; yet, this is the strategically relevant value one round earlier, hence
required for recursion.
To illustrate, consider a (β, δ)-discounter with linear instantaneous utility, say player 1.
Immediate agreement on x and once delayed agreement on y with the same (continuation)
value U1 = x1 = βδy1 imply the different rejection values βδx1 = βδU1 and βδ2y1 = δU1,
respectively. Without further knowledge regarding the underlying equilibrium outcomes, a
player i’s minimal proposer value v∗i (which is i’s minimal continuation value when respond-
ing) is hence insufficient to determine her minimal rejection value w∗i .
The approach proposed in this paper directly analyzes the off-path “punishments” (con-
tinuation equilibria) that support all equilibrium play and underlie the minimal values
(v∗i , w
∗
i ). Its basic idea is that the game’s stationarity property will nonetheless entail a
tractable structure for such punishments, since only two types of round need to be dis-
tinguished in terms of deviations: any round in which the same party i ∈ {1, 2} gets to
make an offer has the same sets of both equilibrium plays and continuation equilibria. If
a particular “optimal” assignment of the latter as punishments deters deviations from any
equilibrium play, it achieves this at any such stage, also off-path, independent of history.
How much tractability is thus gained then depends on how “simple” this optimal assignment
can be made. In the next secion I show what optimality of punishment means, and how four
appropriately chosen equilibrium outcomes suffice to describe all off-path play.
The following two reservation shares of a player i (subject to feasibility) will feature
prominently in the analysis. (Under the stronger assumption 2 this extra notation could
easily be dispensed with.) First, her (immediate) reservation share for a given rejection
value U ∈ Ui (Ai) is
πi (U) ≡ min {q ∈ [0, 1] |ui (q) ≥ U} ;
16It is straightforward to show that stationary equilibrium implies immediate agreement after any history
(see appendix A.5).
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player i then accepts any offer above πi (U) whose rejection would yield value U . Second,
her delayed reservation share for delay t and immediate value (instantaneous utility) u ∈
ui ([0, 1]) is
φi (u, t) ≡ max {q ∈ [0, 1] |u ≥ Ui (q, t)} ;
player i then rejects offer q with value u = u (q) for any promised agreement with delay t
that has her share greater than φi (u, t).17
4.1 Optimal Simple Penal Codes and Simple Play
Due to the conceptual similarity, I adopt the terminology introduced by Abreu (1988) for
infinitely repeated games.18 The major difference as well as innovation is that, due to
the sequential nature of moves (see below), I base the analysis on sequences of play—for
short “plays”—rather than paths; such a play extends paths to include the entire response
rules used along the path rather than just the on-path responses.19 I then call an assign-
ment of punishments supporting all equilibrium play (of both G1 and G2) an optimal penal
code (OPC), and I call it an optimal simple penal code (OSPC) if punishment is history-
independent, with a single punishment per player per role (proposer or respondent) in which
this player may deviate.
The sequential nature of moves within a round complicates the analysis relative to re-
peated games because an OPC cannot simply assign a deviant player’s worst continuation
equilibrium. The proposer’s punishment for a deviant offer is constrained by the respondent’s
incentives after such a deviation, which affords the proposer a strategic advantage; e.g., a
worse continuation equilibrium for the proposer may at the same time weaken the respon-
dent’s current bargaining position and thus make deviant offers more attractive. Indeed,
Mailath et al. (2015) present related examples of infinitely repeated sequential-move games
in which the second mover’s “incentive constraint” forces any OPC to fine-tune punishment
to the first mover’s particular deviation, so that no OSPC exists.
Optimal Simple Punishment. The trade-off between providing incentives within-round
and under continuation is, however, less complicated here: the respondent’s acceptance ends
the game, and the agreement round’s actions determine all payoffs. Punishment therefore
takes place only after deviations that result in a rejection, and for a given punishment
17Since T contains infinity, for completeness, set φi (u, ∞) = 1 for any u ∈ ui ([0, 1]).
18I am deeply grateful to my former colleague Can Çeliktemur for pointing out this similarity to me at an
early stage of this project.
19Against the background of Abreu’s influential work, I define various concepts of this section only verbally;
the full-fledged formalism can be found in appendix A.
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the offer that led to it is inconsequential. Call then (i) any deviant rejection of an offer
a respondent deviation, and (ii) any deviant offer that the respondent may reject without
deviating herself a proposer deviation. These two types exhaust all (one-stage) deviations
that lead to punishment: e.g., given a strategy profile prescribes proposal x and response rule
Y , if a proposal x′ ∈ Y is rejected, this constitutes a respondent deviation, and if a proposal
x′ /∈ Y \{x} is rejected, this constitutes a proposer deviation. The following result shows that
optimality of punishments is a property of their rejection values and optimal punishments
can always be made simple. (Existence of an OPC will be established constructively, as part
of the equilibrium characterization in theorem 1.)
Lemma 1. Any OPC’s punishments (i) minimize the respondent’s rejection value after
respondent deviations, and (ii) maximize the respondent’s rejection value after proposer de-
viations. Whenever an OPC exists, there exists an OSPC.
The first property, regarding a responding player’s deviant rejection, is straightforward: if
rejection of some offer cannot be deterred by her least preferred continuation equilibrium (i.e.,
one with minimal rejection value) then there cannot be an equilibrium in which she accepts
this offer; conversely, if it can be deterred by some continuation equilibrium then a fortiori




of a player i’s optimal respondent






The second property is driven by the proposer advantage. A proposer can always deviate
to an offer that the respondent will accept and thus evade punishment. In particular, a
responding player accepts any offer whose value exceeds her maximal rejection value, in any
equilibrium. This guarantees a minimal rent to the proposer, equal to the full efficiency gain
from immediate agreement over the respondent’s most preferred rejection outcome (which is
inefficient due to the delay). Given (ii), any deviant offer that the respondent compliantly
rejects would dissipate this rent, as the respondent obtains the same value—her maximal
rejection value—but in this case inefficiently. Hence, a proposer can never do better by
deviating than by making the lowest accepted offer. However, a play where at some stage
the proposing player would gain by deviating to an accepted offer could not be supported
by any specification of punishments.20




be any outcome of player i’s
optimal proposer punishment—i.e., an equilibrium outcome of game Gj such that respondent





is maximal—it must be that i’s minimal proposer value









. Not only could proposer i always obtain at
20Recall that we are concerned with one-stage deviations only; hence, whether such a deviation exists can
be determined from play alone. Allowing for any punishments, there may also be a deviation to a rejected
offer that is even more attractive, but it would be a profitable deviation from prescribed play in any case.
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least this value by making an accepted offer, but immediate agreement on the division x












as “unconditional” continuation outcome). Because she may always make
an offer that the respondent would never refuse, there cannot be a delay equilibrium that is
worse for the proposer than her least preferred immediate-agreement equilibrium.
The first part of lemma 1 shows that it is without loss of generality to restrict OPCs to four
optimal punishments, one per player per type of deviation, with the respective properties
(i) and (ii); these then support any equilibrium play, of both G1 and G2. Given how it
identifies the perpetrator, an OPC is then simple in the sense that punishment need not
fit the crime. However, so far this simplicity concerns only first deviations from prescribed
play; the punishments themselves may still be rather complex.
The second part of lemma 1 extends the simplicity of an OPC to its own punishments,
thus creating an OSPC. It is based on the observation that any OPC supports, in partic-
ular, the play of its own constituent punishments. Intuitively, we can therefore iteratively
apply the same optimal punishments also to deviations from first punishment play (second
deviations), and then also to deviations from second punishment play (third deviations) etc.
Thus we create an OPC in which player i’s proposer and respondent deviations are followed
by the same respective punishment, entirely independent of their history, i.e. an OSPC; e.g.,
a proposer deviation by player 1 from its own punishment’s play then simply “restarts” this
very punishment play. It is therefore without loss of generality to restrict OPCs to OSPCs,
and these are fully described by four optimal punishment plays.
Simple Play. Consequentialist parties care only about outcomes of play, not play itself;
making an offer that is commonly known to be rejected is therefore tantamount to not
offering anything at all. The final simplification result removes such redundancy regarding
equivalent types of equilibrium play (in particular, optimal punishment play).
Call a play that ends in agreement on division x in round n (perpetual disagreement
means x = (0, 0) and n = ∞) a simple play if (i) all rejected offers are minimal offers (i.e.,
zero offers), and (ii) all response rules specify maximal acceptance thresholds, equal to the
respective respondent’s reservation share for her maximal rejection value in a disagreement
round m < n, and to xR(n) in the terminal agreement round n. Note that, given the players’
maximal rejection values, simple play is fully determined by its ultimate outcome, here (x, t)
for t = n − 1.21 For the purpose of characterizing equilibrium outcomes, with optimal
punishments, this is indeed without loss of generality.
21As defined here, simple play exists for every equilibrium outcome, but not necessarily for every possible
outcome; e.g., if player 2’s maximal rejection value implies a zero reservation share, then there is no simple
play of G1 with delayed agreement.
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Lemma 2. Whenever an OPC exists and (x, t) is an equilibrium outcome of game Gi, the
simple play of this outcome is an equilibrium play of Gi.
In conclusion, all strategic complexity off the equilibrium path can be summarized by









; these define four sim-
ple plays that form an OSPC supporting all equilibrium play, of both (sub-) games G1 and
G2. Moreover, to check whether an outcome is an equilibrium outcome it suffices to check
only for one-stage deviations from its simple play, which is straightforward. These insights
afford a greatly simplified structure for equilibrium analysis.
4.2 Equilibrium Characterization
The equilibrium characterization exploits a “fixed-point property” of any quadruple of op-
timal punishment outcomes: by means of their implied OSPC they support themselves as
the most extreme outcomes—in terms of their rejection values (lemma 1)—among all the
outcomes that they support. Since there may be multiple OSPCs, I first map this fixed-





i )i∈I necessarily solve. These equations, in general, have multiple solutions, and the




i )i∈I are found as their unique extreme solution, whose existence follows from
the continuity assumptions on preferences. These values then characterize the set of OSPCs,
and thus also the set of equilibrium outcomes. This is the central result of this paper.
Define first the function κi : T × Ui (Ai) × Uj (Aj) → R+ such that




0 t = 0
φi (vi, t) + max {φj (vj, t − 1) , φj (uj (0) , t)} t > 0
,
which measures the surplus-cost of delay t in Gi given proposer values vi and vj, and which is
non-decreasing in each of its arguments. Its significance derives from the fact that, given the
minimal proposer values v∗i and v
∗
j from optimal punishment, game Gi has an equilibrium
outcome with (positive) delay t if and only if κi
(




≤ 1. The restriction to simple
play allows to reduce the necessary and sufficient incentive constraints for agreement on x




v∗j , t − 1
)
, φj (uj (0) , t)
}
; κi
therefore measures the incentive cost of delay t as the minimal amount of surplus, so that
both players can be promised a large enough share with this delay.
Let then E ⊆
∏
i∈I (ui ([0, 1]) × Ui (Ai) × T ) be the set of sextuples (vi, wi, ti)i∈I such
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that, for each i ∈ I,
vi = ui (1 − πj (Uj (1 − πi (wi) , 1))) (4)
wi = inf {Ui (φi (vi, t) , t + 1) |t ∈ T, t ≤ ti} (5)
ti = sup {t ∈ T |κi (t, vi, vj) ≤ 1} (6)
Lemma 6 in appendix A.3 shows how each element (vi, wi, ti)i∈I of E corresponds to a
quadruple of punishment outcomes that are “constrained” optimal in the following sense: by
means of a construction similar to an OSPC, they support a subset of equilibrium outcomes
that includes themselves (so they are indeed equilibrium outcomes), and on which they are
optimal; i.e., constrained to this subset, they yield the minimal punishment values (vi, wi)i∈I
and supremal delays (ti)i∈I .





necessarily in E. However, in general, due to the interdependency of punishments—harsher
punishments permit longer delays, and longer delays permit harsher punishments—there may
be (other) constrained OSPCs. In fact, the set E always contains an element (vi, wi, ti)i∈I
with t1 = t2 = 0 that corresponds to a “trivial” constrained OSPC: irrespective of who
deviated in a given round, it specifies the same punishment; thus this OSPC reduces to a
single stationary equilibrium in which player i always offers 1−φi (vi, 0) = πj (wj) and always
accepts with threshold πi (wi) = πi (Ui (φi (vi, 0) , 1)), so there is immediate agreement after
any history.




i )i∈I must then be its
unique extreme element; i.e., any other element (vi, wi, ti)i∈I satisfies v
∗
i ≤ vi, w
∗
i ≤ wi and
t∗i ≥ ti for both i.




i )i∈I exist, and they are equal to the unique extreme element








are outcomes of player i’s optimal




















































v∗j , t − 1
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A few features of optimal punishments are noteworthy in view of the strategic advantage
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enjoyed by a proposing player. First, a player’s optimal proposer punishment is unique
and involves no delay: given her impatience, the respondent’s rejection value is maximized
by the maximal credible share with least delay following rejection (4). Second, an initially
proposing player i’s least preferred equilibrium outcomes for various delays are necessarily
indifferent, all yielding her the same minimal value v∗i , and this allows to pin down optimal
respondent punishment (5). Finally, whether and how long agreement may be delayed is
fully determined by the players’ incentives as proposer (6); this drives the aforementioned
indifference property (see also the characterization of A∗i in theorem 1).
Example 1 shows that the equilibrium characterization neither reduces to uniqueness nor
to stationarity of equilibrium, nor to stationarity of optimal punishments. It is never an
“anything goes”-type result, however, as the players’ impatience imposes a certain structure
on equilibrium through the proposer advantage: as a function of delay, the set of equilibrium
divisions monotonically shrinks (since φi (u, ·) is increasing, the upper and lower bounds on
each player’s share converge), and perpetual disagreement is never an equilibrium outcome
(note that v∗i > ui (0) ≥ Ui (0, ∞)). In section 5, I present further detail, examples and
discussion regarding the structure of equilibria for various preferences.
Theorem 1 is partly reminiscient of Merlo and Wilson (1995, thms 7 and 8), who assume
ED and analyze bargaining by multiple players under a Markovian process governing the
protocol as well as the size of the cake. They also characterize the set of equilibrium values
by means of an extremal fixed point, but its nature differs significantly. ED implies that there
is a stationary equilibrium outcome that maximizes one player’s value at the same time as it
minimizes all other players’ values. In the two-player case this simple relationship between
punishment and reward implies that optimal punishments are efficient and, without loss of
generality, also stationary. Only in the case of more than two players, one player’s optimal
punishment might necessitate some punishment of another player and some inefficiency, thus
complicating the incentive structure (cf. Burgos et al., 2002b).
By contrast, here such a complication arises already with two players, and from a very
different source: the dynamic inconsistency of a player’s time preferences. Optimal pun-
ishment might require delay, in which case it is both inefficient and non-stationary. The
extreme equilibria are then “truly” non-stationary in the sense that their continuation is
non-stationary after any history. Equilibrium delay does not necessitate multiple stationary
equilibria; indeed, it does not even depend on the existence of a stationary equilibrium.
This distinguishes the delay obtained here from that obtained in other extensions of the
original Rubinstein (1982) model that maintain a stationary game structure and ED, all
of which rely on multiple stationary equilibria to support delay (Haller and Holden, 1990;
Muthoo, 1990; van Damme, Selten, and Winter, 1990; Fernandez and Glazer, 1991; Myerson,
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1991; Avery and Zemsky, 1994). The sole exception I am aware of is that of Busch and Wen
(1995).22 Their model of negotiation enriches bargaining by a disagreement game, which
is a fixed simultaneous-move game played after any rejected offer and determines a stream
of payoffs before agreement. The truly non-stationary equilibria they construct exploit the
resultingly richer preference domain through non-stationary play of the disagreement game
similar to folk theorems for repeated games, but constrained by the parties’ incentives to
reach agreement.
Existence of an OSPC is equivalent to the existence of minimum values v∗i and w
∗
i (as
argued, a “constrained” OSPC and hence an equilibrium always exist, however). This is
non-trivial here, as the set of equilibrium outcomes need not be closed.23 The generality of
assumption 1 means that the length of equilibrium delay might have no upper bound, despite
the fact that perpetual disagreement is never an equilibrium outcome due to the proposer
advantage (see appendix B.2 for an example). While existence of a minimal value v∗i follows
from standard continuity even with unbounded delay, the (only) role played by impatience
property (3.c) is to ensure that the minimal value w∗i also exists in this case, because the
delay of agreement that is required for optimal punishment is then bounded.
5 Uniqueness v. Multiplicity, and Delay
For economic applications, where bargaining arises naturally in various contexts (household
decision-making, wage setting, international trade agreements etc.), uniqueness of the bar-
gaining prediction is an important concern. Any uncertainty about this one aspect of a model
feeds through all of the conclusions drawn from it. The following characterization of those
preference profiles (within the general class defined by assumption 1) for which equilibrium
is indeed unique is immediate from theorem 1.
Corollary 1. Equilibrium is unique if and only if the set E is a singleton. Whenever
unique, equilibrium is stationary and has immediate agreement after any history: player




and always accepts with the threshold
πi (w∗i ) = πi (Ui (φi (v
∗
i , 0) , 1)), i ∈ I.
These necessary and sufficient conditions for uniqueness do not isolate preference proper-
ties at the individual level: fixing one party’s preferences, whether equilibrium is unique or
displays multiplicity generally depends on those of the opponent. For the purposes of applied
22I am indebted to Paola Manzini for drawing my attention to these authors’ work.
23Although the equilibrium concept introduced in definition 1 is equivalent to a version of subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium, existing results based on the upper hemi-continuity of its equilibrium correspondence (e.g.,
Börgers, 1991) cannot be applied here, because they assume finitely many players.
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work, this is hardly useful. Below, I therefore investigate what broad qualitative properties
of preferences at the individual level imply uniqueness on the one hand, and multiplicity and
delay on the other. For the latter case I also highlight general properties of the equilibrium
set.
5.1 Uniqueness
Already stationary equilibrium need not always be unique, and this is so even under ED
(see Rubinstein, 1982). However, the set of stationary equilibria is fully determined by
the curvature properties of the parties’ preferences regarding their surplus share, which are
essentially orthogonal to their dynamic (in-)consistency.24 Indeed, the same axioms that
have been postulated in order to guarantee uniqueness of stationary equilibrium under ED
(e.g., Binmore et al., 1986; Hoel, 1986; Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990) also do so within the
much more general class of preferences analyzed here. For instance, consider the following
property.25
Definition 2. Player i’s preferences exhibit immediacy if, for any two shares q and q′, and
any positive ǫ,
ui (q) = Ui (q′, 1) ⇒ ui (q + ǫ) > Ui (q′ + ǫ, 1) .
Starting from indifference between an immediate and a once delayed agreement, imme-
diacy says that an increase in one’s surplus share is more valuable when immediate. With
impatience, indifference requires that the delayed share exceed the immediate one, so imme-
diacy extends a basic property of any discounted concave utility to non-separable preferences.
Because it is concerned with comparisons of only immediate and once delayed agreements,
it does not restrict whether or how preferences are dynamically inconsistent.
Lemma 3. If both players’ preferences exhibit immediacy, stationary equilibrium is unique.
Immediacy ensures that the proposer’s surplus rent in immediate rather than once de-
layed (history-independent) agreement is monotonically increasing in the share that the
respondent would obtain by rejecting; e.g., if any offer’s rejection would subsequently result
in immediate agreement on division x, then the proposing player i’s such surplus rent equals
(1 − πj (Uj (xj, 1))) − (1 − xj) = xj − πj (Uj (xj, 1)). Its increasingness implies that the
backwards-induction dynamics are well behaved: starting from any (history-independent)
agreement, backwards induction produces a unique limit, i.e. a unique stationary point.26
24Appendix A.5 provides a full characterization of stationary equilibrium, for the general case.
25This is essentially a reformulation in utility terms of the “increasing loss to delay” axiom of Osborne
and Rubinstein, 1990, pp. 35-36.
26If the rent were non-monotonic, the limit may depend on the starting division, yielding multiple station-
ary points.
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A unique stationary equilibrium is the only equilibrium with immediate agreement after
any history. This equilibrium is unique overall whenever delay is not self-enforcing in the
sense that it enlarges the scope for punishment so much that it effectively supports itself.
Consider then the following preference property.
Definition 3. Player i’s preferences exhibit a weak present bias if, for any two shares q
and q′, and any delay t,
ui (q) = Ui (q′, t) ⇒ Ui (q, 1) ≤ Ui (q′, t + 1) . (7)
Present bias means that a party becomes more patient when an immediate and an indif-
ferent delayed reward are pushed into the future. Hence, if a present-biased individual, in a
period’s time, would be indifferent between receiving a reward q immediately and receiving
a reward q′ with t periods of delay, she currently prefers the larger later reward.
Recall now that, due to the proposer advantage, delay cannot hurt a proposing party
beyond her least preferred immediate agreement. Under weak present bias, delay cannot
hurt this party as the respondent either: rejection necessarily entails a minimal delay of one
period, but beyond this “critical” period she is more patient. Hence, subject to indifference as
the proposer, she cannot be made worse off as the respondent; delay cannot be self-enforcing.
Proposition 1. If, in addition to immediacy, both players’ preferences exhibit a weak present
bias, then equilibrium is unique.
Together with immediacy, weak present bias provides a simple set of sufficient conditions
for uniqueness. Both properties are readily checked for any given preferences, and both are
readily testable empirically.
The interpretation of property (7) as weak present bias is most straightforward for dis-
counted utility, where U (q, t) = d (t)·u (q). Letting d (t) ≡
∏t
s=1 δ (s), weak present bias then
reduces to δ (1) ≤ δ (t), saying that no future period of delay is discounted more heavily than
the first one from the immediate present.27 Any hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic discounting
exhibits this property, with an actual bias: the (β, δ)-model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting
has δ (1) = βδ < δ = δ (t) for any t > 1, and hyperbolic discounting has δ (·) increasing.28
Proposition 1 establishes the robustness of the bargaining wisdom received from the study
of ED to various forms of present bias: equilibrium is unique as well as efficient, it is easily
27Halevy (2008) introduces a strict version of this discounting property, which he calls “diminishing im-
patience”, and relates it to non-linear probability weighting of consumption risk. The weak formulation of
property (7) means it also covers ED as the limiting case where δ (·) is constant.
28The non-separable models of Benhabib et al. (2010) and Noor (2011) were both designed to capture the
very same pattern of preference reversals that hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic discounting explain, and it
can easily be verified that they, too, exhibit a weak present bias.
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computed on the basis of only the players’ attitudes to a single (the first) period of delay and
has familiar comparative statics. If one believes in the essence of present bias but finds the
evidence inconclusive as to what exact functional form it assumes, it is comforting to learn
that equilibrium is robust to any mis-specification of higher-order delay attitudes. Moreover,
the finding that the historically main mode of surplus sharing is efficient under present bias is
good news for its evolutionary explanations (e.g., Dasgupta and Maskin, 2005; Netzer, 2009):
otherwise, communities without a present bias would have had an evolutionary advantage,
making its survival hard to understand.
Most importantly, proposition 1 expands the scope of applied work, which shows strong
interest in the study of present-biased time preferences—in particular (β, δ)-discounting—
but has hitherto lacked a strategically founded bargaining solution. Its application requires
some caution, however, as the following example indicates.
Example 2. Let the two parties’ preferences be given by Ui (q, t) = di (t) · q with di (0) =
1 > di (t) = βiδti for all t > 0, (βi, δi) ∈ (0, 1)
2. The unique equilibrium of the game in which





For a given positive period-length, this prediction is indistinguishable from that under ED
where each player i has preferences Ui (q, t) = δ̃tiq with δ̃i ≡ βiδi (cf. Bernheim and Rangel,
2009, pp. 69-71).
Whichever continuous-time version of (β, δ)-discounting is adopted (cf. Harris and Laib-
son, 2013; Pan et al., 2015), the limiting case of very frequent offers that is commonly
focused on in applications becomes problematic. Either a player’s bias is taken to discon-




as δi → 1 (regardless of relative speeds of convergence), and the bar-
gaining outcome is fully determined by the players’ very short-run impatience; the initial
proposer’s advantage then prevails for arbitrarily frequent offers, and—failing to generate an
equal split—the model is at odds with the Nash bargaining solution.29
Or an extended notion of the “present” of length τi > 0 is adopted, such as di (t) equal to
δti whenever t ≤ τi and βiδ
t
i otherwise. Then, however, as the length of a bargaining period
falls below some player’s τi, the model exhibits multiple equilibria and delay, of the type
presented in example 1 (there 1 ≤ τ1 < 2 ).
A related conceptual issue arises concerning the possibly distinct times of agreement and
29Notice that any bias βi < 1, however small, means that in the limit this player obtains none of the
surplus in bargaining against an exponential discounter.
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consumption feasibility. If there is an exogenous lag τ̂ between agreement and consumption,
exceeding the length of time for which there is a “present bias”, the unique equilibrium has





; only the “long-run”
discounting matters, because each player i discounts even immediate agreements with extra
factor βi.
Taking a broad perspective on what is being consumed, it could also be a bargainer’s
relevant others’ esteem, proportional to the surplus she fetches (e.g., when a union leader
negotiates on behalf of her union). The agreement reached might then differ drastically,
depending on whether the bargaining is done behind closed doors (there is a lag between
agreement and consumption, and only long-run discounting matters) or in the presence of
such relevant others (when the timing of agreement and consumption coincide, and the
degrees of present bias are the main determinant of the division).30
5.2 Multiplicity and Delay
In view of the sufficient conditions for uniqueness in proposition 1, multiplicity of equilib-
rium can arise from two conceptually distinct sources: (i) violations of immediacy, and (ii)
violations of weak present bias. The former relate to the curvature of utility in the surplus
share and entail multiple stationary equilibria, which may also support delay when used as
history-dependent (non-stationary) punishments. The latter relate to the particular form of
dynamic inconsistency and allow delay to be self-enforcing (rather than relying on stationary
equilibria to support it). This section first highlights a few general structural properties of
the equilibrium set whenever there exist delay equilibria, regardless of their source. Then it
goes on to separately discuss each of the two potential sources.
5.2.1 Gradual Agreement and Equal Split
Delay can only arise in a non-stationary equilibrium: if there were a unique, history-
independent continuation equilibrium, the proposing party could appropriate any efficiency
gains from immediate agreement with an accepted offer. Equilibrium disagreement requires
a “punishment” for any such attempt, favoring the responding party, to rationalize the fol-
lowing strategic reasoning: although Pareto-improvements are available, the proposing party
believes that by offering one she would induce the opponent to expect an even superior (non-
Pareto-improving) agreement and, accordingly, reject the proposal. This belief supports an
30I thank Erik Eyster and David Cooper for independently pointing out the following: any (common) lag
between time of agreement and time of consumption does not affect the unique bargaining outcome under ED
(this can be seen from the functions πi), but under (β, δ)-discounting would shift bargaining power toward
the player who is more patient in the long-run.
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offer that is unfavorable vis-à-vis the delayed outcome for the respondent, hence the delay.
Given supporting punishments exist, the eventual agreement determines all restrictions
on possible equilibrium play during any disagreement round: (i) the proposer’s (rejected)
offer is no better for the respondent than the eventual agreement, and (ii) the respondent
rejects all offers that are better for the proposer than the eventual agreement. Observe now
that, since the parties are impatient, the value of the eventual agreement increases across
subsequent rounds along the equilibrium path, as the remaining delay gets shorter. Hence,
the set of Pareto-improvements shrinks, and the parties may make ever greater “concessions”
that nonetheless result in disagreement; thus they may always agree gradually.
Formally, for any equilibrium play (xn, Y n)t+1n=1, define party i’s concession in round n,




j if i = P (n), and as the supremal
opponent share that she would accept if i is the respondent, i.e. bni = sup {xj ∈ [0, 1] |x ∈ Y
n}
if i = R (n). Call an equilibrium with outcome (x, t) a gradual-agreement equilibrium if its




i for both i and all n ≤ t.
Any such equilibrium has the intuitive property that both parties become more and more
conciliatory over the course of bargaining as they keep failing to reach agreement. Gradual
agreement meaningfully applies only to equilibria with delay, of course; then, however, its
requirement is rather strong, as it treats a player’s offers and response rules symmetrically
in terms of concessions (it clearly implies increasing offers by each player). Nonetheless,
gradual agreement is without loss of generality.
Proposition 2. If both parties i ∈ I are uniformly impatient, so that for any positive share
q, t < t′ implies Ui (q, t) > Ui (q, t′), then every equilibrium outcome is the outcome of a
gradual-agreement equilibrium.31
Under gradual agreement, a player’s concession has the interpretation of the credi-
ble promise that she will subsequently always be willing to give up at least this share,
as long as the other player keeps to her promise. The fact that this promise has no
material counterpart—rejected offers enter neither payoffs nor preferences directly, only
strategically—makes it distinct from the commitment mechanisms in related work explaining
such “gradualism” (Admati and Perry, 1991; Compte and Jehiel, 2004).32
The final result of this section relates equilibrium to the influential axiomatic bargain-
ing solution proposed by Nash (1950), which imposes the intuitive property that symmetric
bargaining problems should yield a symmetric, i.e. equal, division. Under (symmetric) ED,
31If the requirement for gradual agreement were weakened to non-decreasing concessions, this proposition
would hold true for any preference profile.
32In these papers the value of a player’s outside option increases in the opponent’s past concessions. Li
(2007) obtains a similar effect with history-dependent preferences.
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given immediacy, this is here also the limiting outcome of the unique equilibrium as offers be-
come arbitrarily frequent (Binmore et al., 1986, prop. 4). For more general time preferences,
if delay can be supported then the following symmetry result obtains.
Proposition 3. If the two bargaining parties’ preferences are symmetric, then an immediate
equal split is an equilibrium outcome whenever there exists an equilibrium with delayed agree-
ment. More generally, an equal split with delay t − 1 is an equilibrium outcome whenever
there exists an equilibrium in which agreement is delayed by t periods.
In reasonably symmetric bargaining situations, the possibility of delay implies that the
parties may instead quickly agree on an equal split. This holds true here without recourse
to a limiting argument, hence even for non-negligible costs of disagreement; as offers become
more frequent, the required delay equilibria are, however, more likely to exist (see example
3 below).
5.2.2 Non-Immediacy, Multiple Stationary Equilibria, and Delay
Almost any model of time preferences assumes separability in reward and delay; i.e., an
atemporal utility function on rewards can be defined that is being discounted for delay.
Concavity, or even weaker strict log-concavity, of these utilities then implies immediacy,
hence a unique stationary equilibrium, and this is the unique equilibrium overall under weak
present bias. Conversely, if at least one party’s utility exhibits sufficiently strong convexity,
multiple stationary equilibria arise, and these may then also support delay, irrespective of
the dynamic (in-)consistency of discounting. Already Rubinstein (1982) presents an example
of this possibility under ED, when both parties have symmetric preferences represented by
U (q, t) = δt · exp (q).33
When time preferences are not separable, however, the curvature of utility from the
reward can depend on its delay. Concavity of utility from immediate rewards then ceases to
be sufficient for a unique stationary equilibrium, and the preference property of immediacy
imposes a restriction on how the curvatures for immediate and once-delayed rewards are
related: at indifference, marginal utility should be greater immediately.
An interesting model that is well-suited to illustrate this point, and also how immediacy
might fail, is that of magnitude-dependent discounting proposed by Noor (2011). It has time
33This is the best-known example of multiplicity under ED. Originally, it uses representation q − c · t, but
this equals ln (δt · exp (q)) for c = − ln (δ) and is therefore equivalent. (Recall that there is no uncertainty.)
While he does not fully characterize equilibrium outcomes under multiplicity, in particular concerning the
possible delays, appendix B.1 shows how theorem 1 applies in a straightforward manner to deliver this
characterization.
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preferences represented by U (q, t) = δ (q)t · u (q), where the discount factor δ (·) is an in-
creasing function of the reward, and reward-utility u (·) is concave. Thus the model captures
empirically observed magnitude effects, where larger rewards are discounted less than smaller
ones, and it behaviorally subsumes the (separable) hyperbolic discounting model. Indeed, it
is straightforward to show that such preferences satisfy weak present bias.34 Yet, due to the
reward-dependence of discounting, immediacy may fail despite the concavity of u: supposing
indifference u (q) = δ (q′) · u (q′), immediacy would require u (q + ǫ) > δ (q′ + ǫ) · u (q′ + ǫ),
which can be rewritten as
u (q + ǫ) > δ (q′) · u (q′ + ǫ) + (δ (q′ + ǫ) − δ (q′)) · u (q′ + ǫ) .
While concavity of u implies that u (q + ǫ) > δ (q′) · u (q′ + ǫ), since discount factor δ (·)
increases in the size of the reward, the second term on the right-hand side is positive and
may well outweigh the concavity. Hence multiple stationary equilibria may arise, and also
delay equilibria. This is true even when both u (·) and δ (·) · u (·) are concave. Since the
basic construction of delay equilibria in this case is familiar from the literature (Avery and
Zemsky, 1994), I present a simple numeric example only in the appendix B.1; note here,
however, that the results of section 5.2.1 apply.
5.2.3 Near-Future Bias, and Self-Enforcing Delay
Given immediacy, a violation of weak present bias is necessary for the emergence of delay
equilibria. When it concerns the relatively near future, it is sufficient; i.e., in contradiction
to (7), for some relatively small t, an indifference ui (q) = Ui (q′, t) is broken in favor of the
sooner agreement once both outcomes lie in the future, Ui (q, 1) > Ui (q′, t + 1).35
Under discounting, using decomposition di (t) ≡
∏t
s=1 δi (s), a near-future bias means
that δi (s) < δi (1) for s > 1 not too large; i.e., a near-future period of delay is discounted
more heavily than the first one. Whereas under weak present bias the minimal per-period
discount factor ∆i (t) ≡ inf {δi (s) |s ∈ T, 0 < s ≤ t} is independent of the horizon t and
constant at ∆i (∞) = δi (1), under near-future bias it initially decreases as the horizon is
extended: ∆i (s) < ∆i (1) for s > 1 not too large. Ebert and Prelec (2007), Bleichrodt
et al. (2009), Takeuchi (2011) and Pan et al. (2015) have advanced functional forms for near-
future-biased discounting; in graphical terms, all of these discounting functions are initially
34Take any indifference u (q) = δ (q′)t · u (q′) and note that q′ ≥ q by impatience, which implies that
δ (q) · u (q) ≤ δ (q′) · u (q) = δ (q′)t+1 · u (q′).
35Of course, offers must not take too much time for the “bias horizon” to be relevant; e.g., if a counter-offer
would take forever, the first offer is an ultimatum, and there is a unique equilibrium in which the initial
proposer obtains the entire surplus without delay.
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concave, so their decline is steepest at some positive delay rather than at zero.
For a near-future biased bargainer a further period of delay in the near future is more
critical than the first, initial period of delay. To avoid a costly future delay, she has to rely
on her future self. However, to her future self the same delay, in absolute time, will not be as
critical any more, in relative time. Put succinctly, a given future delay is more painful now
than it will be later—she will subsequently become more patient and, accordingly, tougher
in bargaining than she would initially want herself to be.36
This type of dynamic inconsistency makes delay self-enforcing, because any delay on path
automatically implies the threat of an additional delay off-path, in the event of a rejection:
assuming the additional delay would be particularly costly to her, such a bargainer may
accept so bad a deal as the respondent now, that—in terms of a threat—this supports
her unacceptable offers as the proposer later, when she will be more patient. Although
her proposer advantage limits the power of this threat, as offers become frequent and this
advantage vanishes, delay equilibria emerge for an arbitrarily small such bias.
The following final example of a near-future bias extends example 1 to illustrate the
usefulness of theorem 1 for fully characterizing a rich equilibrium set, to demonstrate its
general properties highlighted in section 5.2.1, and to assess the potential costs of delay.






δt t ≤ τ
γδt t > τ
, for (δ, γ) ∈ (0, 1)2 and τ > 0.
First, note that the τ + 1-th period of delay is discounted most heavily: whereas the per-
period discount factors are δ (t) = δ for all t 6= τ +1, for that period it is δ (τ + 1) = γδ. Since
τ > 0, weak present bias is violated, and there is instead a bias toward not experiencing more
than τ periods of delay. (Immediacy is clearly satisfied.) Hence ∆ (t) equals δ for all t ≤ τ
and γδ for all t > τ ; given ∆ determines whether non-stationary delay equilibria emerge, this
minimal deviation from ED is made only for convenience, to keep the number of parameters
down to a mere three, {δ, γ, τ}. Due to preference symmetry, the player subscript is omitted
throughout this example.
Suppose there is an equilibrium in which agreement is delayed by τ periods: then v∗ =
1−δ
1−γδ2
and w∗ = γδv∗ (see (2) in section 3); delay τ > 0 is then “self-enforcing” if and only if
36As an extreme but instructive example imagine someone who—at any point in time—does not mind
bargaining for, say, 5 rounds, but is extremely averse to bargaining any longer; such a shifting personal
“deadline” (in relative time) is dynamically inconsistent, since as soon as the first round is over this player
will already not mind delaying agreement until round 6.
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Figure 2: Graphs regarding equilibrium delay in example 3. The panel on the left shows the
parametric regions (δ, γ) such that delay equilibria exist for three given values of τ , which
are 1 (blue, orange and green), 25 (brown and green) and 1000 (green). The panel on the
right plots τ̂ (δ, γ) as a function of δ for three given values of γ, which are 0.5 (blue), 0.75
(orange) and 0.99 (green).






, which reduces to




after substituting for v∗. The left-hand side is the present value of the surplus, and the right-
hand side is the present value of the incentive cost of a delay of τ periods: each proposer
requires v∗ = 1−δ
1−γδ2
, and the factor (1 + δ) is due to the fact that the initial proposer does so
immediately whereas the other player does so only next round. Observe that, for any given
τ > 0 and γ < 1, there exist large enough values of δ such that inequality (8) is satisfied (the
left-hand side limits to one whereas the right-hand side limits to zero as δ → 1); generally,
as δ increases, the set of parameters γ and τ for which delay equilibria exist expands, as the
left-hand-side panel of figure 2 illustrates. Whenever such delay equilibria exist, the minimal
proposer and rejection values are obtained only by means of a “truly” non-stationary delay
equilibrium, using optimal punishments.





, and an equal split with any
delay up to τ − 1 periods is then an equilibrium outcome (in particular under immediate
agreement). It may also be reached gradually, say with delay t̂, 0 < t̂ < τ : define a sequence
(bn)t̂+1n=1 of concessions such that b
1 ≡ 0 and bn ≡ 1
2
(
bn−1 + δt̂+1−n · 1
2
)
, noting that the
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sequence is increasing, and that bn falls short of a player’s present value of agreeing on an
equal split with the delay t̂ + 1 − n that remains as of the n-th round, which is δt̂+1−n · 1
2
.
It is straightforward to verify that the following describes equilibrium play with gradual
agreement: in any (disagreement) round n < t̂ + 1 the proposing player P (n) offers the
share bn, and the responding player R (n) accepts with threshold 1 − bn+1 (bn < 1 − bn+1
follows from bn < bn+1 < 1
2





offers the share 1
2




accepts with threshold 1
2
.
Solving for τ , inequality (8) becomes
τ ≤
ln (1 − δ2) − ln (1 − γδ2)
ln (δ)
≡ τ̂ (δ, γ) ,
and if it is satisfied, the maximal delay t∗ equals ⌊τ̂ (δ, γ)⌋, i.e. the greatest integer not
exceeding τ̂ (δ, γ). For any γ < 1, this maximal delay approaches infinity as δ → 1, showing
how small deviations from ED result in the emergence of delay equilibria as offers become
very frequent; e.g., ⌊τ̂ (δ, γ)⌋ = 404 in case δ = γ = 0.999. The right-hand-side panel of
figure 2 illustrates this numerically.
The resulting delays can be very costly. The present value of the surplus in an equilibrium
where agreement is maximally delayed equals γδt
∗
whenever τ ≤ τ̂ (δ, γ). As δ → 1, for any
given γ < 1, not only is τ ≤ τ̂ (δ, γ) going to be satisfied, but the entire surplus vanishes.
For instance, while in the case of δ = γ = 0.99 the maximal surplus loss amounts to roughly
one third of the total, for values of γ that fall short of δ, the loss can be dramatic: up to
99.8% of the surplus can be lost through delay when δ = 0.99999 and γ = 0.99.
When players discount the future only up to a finite number of delays, equilibrium delay
can even be unbounded. Example 6 in appendix B.2 demonstrates this point, by only slightly
modifying the example given here.
6 Concluding Remarks
The reason why two bargaining parties will reach agreement is that delay is costly. A basic
cost of delay stems from impatience, as modeled in economics by time preferences. When
information is perfect, time preferences are the sole driving force of strategic interaction,
and this paper has examined their full implications in alternating-offers bargaining by two
strategically sophisticated parties.
Based on a novel analytical approach that renders the game tractable under minimal
assumptions on time preferences (dynamic inconsistency), its main insights are that any
present bias pushes the parties towards immediate and efficient agreement, while a near-
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future bias allows inefficient delay to be self-enforcing. With respect to the received literature,
the notion of impatience covered here is comprehensive: it requires only that, ceteris paribus,
a party prefers sooner over later, as well as more over less. I have, however, also maintained
two standard assumptions: that time preferences are defined over sure outcomes, and that
they are a fundamental stable trait of how an individual trades off delay and reward. I now
discuss these in turn.
First, any meaningful uncertainty over outcomes would have necessitated extra assump-
tions regarding how the parties evaluate uncertainty that is distributed over time. Yet, in
reduced form, the model also captures bargaining under the shadow of breakdown risk, with
non-linear probability weighting of this risk as the source of the parties’ dynamic inconsis-
tency. Given a (constant) probability 1−p that bargaining breaks down and yields nothing to
both parties whenever they fail to agree, consider preferences Ui (q, t) = gi (pt) · ui (q), where
gi is a general probability-weighting function applied to the “survival” probability for delay t,
and where ui (0) = 0 (see Halevy, 2008; Saito, 2015). These preferences are dynamically con-
sistent if and only if gi is the identity, in which case i maximizes expected utility. Recasting
gi (pt) as a discounting function, all results of this paper apply in a straightforward manner.
Since the preference domain then naturally includes risk, however, this paper’s restriction to
pure strategies warrants reconsideration. This issue, and especially the relationship between
the non-cooperative bargaining solution thus obtained and the axiomatic Nash solution (see
Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson, 1992; Grant and Kajii, 1995) are most notable extensions
for future research.37
Second, the theoretical notion of time preferences is that of a fundamental stable indi-
vidual trait in almost any economic analysis. Recent research suggests, however, that the
choices between various delayed monetary rewards that are usually studied to infer time pref-
erences additionally reflect transitory financial circumstances, as confounds of “pure” time
preferences: e.g., Ambrus, Ásgeirsdóttir, Noor, and Sándor (2015), Carvalho, Meier, and
Wang (2016) and Dean and Sautmann (2016) argue theoretically and show empirically how
such choices systematically respond to liquidity (see also Noor, 2009, for a related point).
This recent attention to rigorously dealing with confounds in time preference research con-
veys optimism that, ultimately, it will be able to reliably identify pure time preferences
empirically, and to also explain the otherwise puzzling amount of heterogeneity of “uncondi-
tionally” measured time preferences found in any study.38 In view of the minimal preference
37Other issues addressed in extensions or variations of the Rubinstein (1982) model under ED may also
warrant reconsideration under dynamic inconsistency. While details of optimal penal codes may vary with
the particular model, the basic structual properties established in section 4.1 appear robust—they essentially
only depend on the proposer’s strategic advantage in bargaining—and accordingly useful for deriving the
optimal punishments explicitly.
38The vast heterogeneity concerns not only the broad quantitative impatience measures implied by in-
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assumptions of this paper, it is likely to cover whatever preference model will emerge from
this research, and hence its basic bargaining implications. Moreover, insights into how ex-
ogenous observables affect attitudes to delay (in addition to pure time preferences) open a
wide range of interesting applications and extensions of this paper’s model; e.g., to study
how bargaining behavior is influenced by liquidity.
Notwithstanding the above empirical issues regarding traditional choice experiments, a
present bias is psychologically intuitive for hedonic utility, and this intuition is supported
by both neurological evidence (e.g., McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, and Cohen, 2004) and
evolutionary arguments (e.g., Netzer, 2009). Neither currently exists for near-future bias as
a stable preference trait. Moreover, this paper’s theoretical findings could also be interpreted
as lending further support for a (weak) present bias over a near-future bias, if one is willing to
assume that evolution has favored preferences that promote predictably efficient agreements.
Concluding from this perspective, when the parties are strategically sophisticated, dynamic
inconsistency of time preferences is unlikely to be a major reason for delay in bargaining.
dividuals’ choices but also their basic qualitative classification into no bias, present bias or future bias.
Considering the importance of time preferences in human decision-making, and especially from an evolu-
tionary perspective, such heterogeneity would be rather surprising for pure time preferences. Note that the
finding of a future bias is essentially one of a near-future bias, which makes it indistinguishable from a present
bias for delay horizons beyond a few weeks. It has also been called “reverse time-inconsistency” (Sayman
and Öncüler, 2009), “increasing impatience” (Attema, Bleichrodt, Rohde, and Wakker, 2010), “hypobolic
discounting” (Eil, 2012) or“patient shifts” (Read, Frederick, and Airoldi, 2012).
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The set A ≡ X × P (X) defines the possible pairs of proposals and response rules. The
stationary strategy σi that specifies “always propose x” and “always respond using rule Y ”
is identified with the pair (x, Y ) ∈ A. The particular division that has player i’s share equal
to one (player j’s share is zero) is denoted by e(i), and a player i’s response rule “accept if
and only if your share is at least q” is denoted by Xi,q.
Take any strategy profile σ, and suppose that if both players act according to σ the
outcome is division x in round m (hence with delay m − 1), where x = (0, 0) and m = ∞
in case of perpetual disagreement. For any n ≤ m, let then hn−1 (σ) ∈ Xn−1 be the round-n
history σ induces, and let (hm−1 (σ) , x) ∈ Xm be its induced (terminal) path. I formally
define σ’s play to be the sequence 〈σ〉 ≡ (〈σ〉n)
m
n=1
∈ Am of offers and response rules it
prescribes along its induced path, i.e. 〈σ〉n ≡ σ (h
n−1 (σ)) for any n ≤ m.
To isolate plays from strategy profiles, call any sequence (xn, Y n)mn=1 ∈ A
m, for m ∈ N, a
play of game Gi if there exists a strategy profile σ in this game such that 〈σ〉 = (xn, Y n)
m
n=1;
this holds true if and only if xn ∈ Y n ⇔ n = m (the condition is identical for both games
G1 and G2), and for a given game, a play defines an equivalence class of strategy profiles.
Next, consider the following mapping that produces “simple” strategy profiles. Given









, define, for each i ∈ I, a mapping σS,i (·)










as a sequence of “states”, say a strategy profile is in “state”
〈σ〉n if it prescribes play 〈σ〉n after a given history, and then define σ
S,i (〈σ̂〉) by the rule that
(1) in round 1 σS,i (〈σ̂〉) is in state 〈σ̂〉1, and
(2) if in round m it is in state 〈σ〉n = (x, Y ), and proposal x
′ is rejected, then in round
m + 1 it is in state
















x′ 6= x ∈ Y
.
This is a well-defined strategy profile with the property that it distinguishes only four types
of deviations from a given prescribed play—one per player per role—and always specifies the
same continuation play after the same type of deviation. It is thus simple in the sense of
minimal history-dependence.
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Finally, given any pair of reservation shares Q ≡ (q1, q2), define, for each i ∈ I, the




the sequence (xn, Y n)t̂+1n=1 ∈ A
t̂+1 such
that











n = t̂ + 1




(i, j) n odd










t̂ = 1 ⇒ qj > 0





A.2 Lemmas 1 and 2
Take any strategy profile σ and any round-n history hn−1: first, let σ|hn−1 denote the re-
striction of σ to continuation histories of hn−1, i.e. histories of the form (hn−1, hm−1) where
hm−1 ∈ Xm−1 for m ∈ N, and second, let σ|h
n−1
denote the strategy profile in game GP (n)
that is obtained from σ|hn−1 upon replacing hn−1 by the initial history h0. (Observe that,
given hn−1, σ|h
n−1





such that, for each i ∈ I, σP,i is a strategy profile in game Gj and σR,i is a













follows: for any strategy profile σ in game Gi, it is the unique strategy profile σ∗,i in this






σP,P (n) x /∈ σR(n) (hn−1 (σ)) \
{
σP (n) (hn−1 (σ))
}
σR,R(n) x ∈ σR(n) (hn−1 (σ))
.
Using this definition, lemmas 1 and 2 are formally summarized in the proposition below;
part (i) establishes the defining property of optimal punishment, part (ii) shows that it is
without loss of generality for optimality to restrict attention to simple punishment, and part
(iii) shows it is without loss of generality for equilibrium to restrict attention to simple play.









be such that, for
















Ui (q, t + 1) . (9)
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such that, for each i ∈ I, σP,i is an equi-









. Then, for any k ∈ I and strategy profile σ̂ in game Gk, 〈σ̂〉













is an equilibrium of Gk.

























































, is an equilibrium play of Gk.









, where it is













. By construction, 〈σ∗〉 = 〈σ̂〉, and continuation play under σ∗ following
any deviation from its path is an equilibrium of the resulting subgame. In order to verify
that σ∗ is an equilibrium it therefore suffices to verify that there are no profitable one-stage
deviations at the histories hn−1 (σ∗) along its path.
Take then any such history h = hn−1 (σ∗), where player P makes an offer to player R,




. Consider any proposal x′ ∈ Ỹ ; σ̂’s being an equilibrium and
the construction of σ∗ imply that











whereby acceptance is optimal for R under σ∗.
Next, consider any proposal x′ /∈ Ỹ \ {x̃}; σ̂’s being an equilibrium and the construction
of σ∗ imply that











whereby rejection is optimal for R under σ∗.
The only remaining case at the responding stage is that of proposal x̃ such that x̃ /∈ Ỹ ;
this implies that n < t̂ + 1, and then σ̂’s being an equilibrium play and the construction of
σ∗ imply that
uR (x̃R) ≤ UR
(













whereby rejection is optimal for R under σ∗.
Finally, consider the proposing player P ’s incentive to propose x′ 6= x̃: if x′ ∈ Ỹ , then


























x̂P , t̂ + 1 − n
)
such deviations are not profitable to P under σ∗.







, it follows from σ̂’s being an equilibrium that
{x ∈ X |xR > q
∗




x̂P , t̂ + 1 − n
)
: R must accept any offer which
exceeds her maximal credible reservation share, and if uP (1 − q∗R) > UP
(
x̂P , t̂ + 1 − n
)
were
true, then, because uP (·) is continuously increasing and q∗R < 1 due to R’s impatience, there
would exist ǫ > 0 such that P ’s offering the accepted share q∗R + ǫ would be a profitable







































































is well-defined. When used as punishments in mapping σ∗,i this quadruple supports the same





, since the punishments for various devia-











therefore supports its own constituent (equilibrium) plays in S, so at no point is there a prof-
itable deviation from any of these strategy profiles; it is therefore a quadruple of equilibria
as in part (i).
Finally, by construction, any of them specifies the same punishment after any deviation
by the same player in the same role, irrespective of history: if proposing player i makes a




, and if responding player i




. Hence it satisfies (10).
Part (iii). Sufficiency is immediate. Suppose then that agreement on x̂ with de-





be a quadruple of equilibria





















is a play. This is immediate only for t̂ = 0; for
t̂ = 1, it is necessary and sufficient that q∗3−k > 0, and for t̂ > 1, it is necessary and sufficient
that both q∗2 > 0 and q
∗
1 > 0. Suppose then that q
∗
i = 0 and note that any equilibrium
must then have respondent i accept any offer. While immediate for any positive offer, there
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cannot be an equilibrium in which respondent i rejects a zero offer by proposer j, because
uj (1 − ǫ) > Uj (1, 1) for small enough positive and hence accepted offers ǫ; i’s rejecting a
zero offer would therefore imply that such offers constitute profitable deviations by proposer
j. Hence, t̂ = 1 implies q∗3−k > 0, and t̂ > 1 implies both q
∗
2 > 0 and q
∗
1 > 0.


















is an equilibrium of Gk. It suffices to
verify that there are no profitable one-stage deviations at the histories hn−1 (σ) for n ≤ t̂+1,





are all equilibria of their respective
subgames. Consider then any such history h = hn−1 (σ), where player P makes an offer to
player R and σ (h) = (x̃, XR,q̃). Observe the following inequalities:
q∗∗R ≤ q̃ ≤ q
∗
R. (11)
While (11) holds by construction if n < t̂ + 1, in the case of n = t̂ + 1 it means that
q∗∗R ≤ x̂R ≤ q
∗
R; however, x̂R < q
∗∗
R would imply that there could not be an equilibrium in
which R accepts an offer as low as x̂R, and x̂R > q∗R would imply that there could not be an
equilibrium in which P offers as much as x̂R.
R’s rejection of any deviant offer q 6= x̃R such that q < q̃ is optimal: by (11), such offers





equals uR (q∗R), and
this exceeds that of acceptance, u (q), since q∗R ≥ q̃ > q. Moreover, R’s impatience implies
that xP,PR > q
∗





< uP (1 − q∗R) ≤
uP (1 − q̃), showing that P has no profitable deviation to rejected offers q < q̃.
Also, R’s acceptance of any offer q ≥ q̃ is optimal, because it yields a value of at least
uR (q̃), whereas rejection yields no more than uR (q∗∗R ), where uR (q̃) ≥ uR (q
∗∗
R ) by (11).
Among these offers, q̃ is clearly the best accepted offer for P .
For n = t̂ + 1, we can already conclude that there is no profitable deviation for either
player, since all offers q < q̃ are deviant. Consider then the remaining case of deviations
in a round n < t̂ + 1: if R’s rejection of the minimal possible, i.e. the zero offer failed to
be optimal, then uR (0) > UR
(
x̂R, t̂ + 1 − n
)
, so there is no offer that R could optimally
reject in favor of agreement on x̂ after t̂ + 1 − n more rounds—in contradiction to this
outcome’s equilibrium property; to a similar effect, if P ’s compliant zero offer were worse




x̂P , t̂ − n + 1
)
, so there is no




In what follows, let
ṽi ≡ inf {Ui (q, t) | (q, t) ∈ A∗i }
w̃i ≡ inf {Ui (q, t + 1) | (q, t) ∈ A∗i }
denote each player i’s infimal punishment values. The theorem is proven via a series of
lemmas. The first one, lemma 4, shows that the set E is non-empty. Lemma 5 then shows
that for every element (vi, wi, ti)i∈I of E there exists a quadruple of outcomes that deliver
the values (vi, wi)i∈I when used as punishment outcomes. (This is the only result that uses
impatience property (3.c), and it will imply that optimal punishments exist.) Lemma 6 goes
on to establish that any such quadruple of outcomes in fact defines a “constrained” OSPC:
as punishment outcomes they support a subset of equilibrium outcomes that includes them,
and constrained to which they are optimal (see equation (9)). This means, in particular,
that for any element (vi, wi, ti)i∈I of E, ṽi ≤ vi and w̃i ≤ wi for each i. The final two lemmas
show that E also contains an element (vi, wi, ti)i∈I such that vi ≤ ṽi and wi ≤ w̃i for each i.




i )i∈I . (Lemma 6 then
implies the characterization of equilibrium outcomes based on the associated OSPC from
lemma 5.)
Lemma 4. The set E is non-empty.
Proof. Consider the following functions fi : [0, 1] → [0, 1] for each i:
fi (q) ≡ 1 − πj (Uj (1 − πi (Ui (q, 1)) , 1)) . (12)
fi is continuous, and it is non-decreasing, with 0 < fi (0) ≤ fi (1) ≤ 1. Hence it possesses
a fixed point that is positive. Take any q̂1 = f1 (q̂1) and define q̂2 ≡ 1 − π1 (U1 (q̂1, 1)); note
that then also q̂1 = 1 − π2 (U2 (q̂2, 1)) and
q̂2 = 1 − π1 (U1 (1 − π2 (U2 (q̂2, 1)) , 1))
≡ f2 (q̂2) .
I will prove that E contains the values (vi, wi, ti)i∈I = (ui (q̂i) , Ui (q̂i, 1) , 0)i∈I .
Given ti = 0, the identity φi (ui (q̂i) , 0) ≡ q̂i immediately yields that the chosen values
satisfy equations (4) and (5), for each i. At the same time, again for each i, whenever t is
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positive,
κi (t, ui (q̂i) , uj (q̂j)) ≥ κi (1, ui (q̂i) , uj (q̂j))
≥ q̂i + q̂j
= q̂i + 1 − πi (Ui (q̂i, 1))
> 1,
where the last inequality uses that q̂i > 0 implies q̂i > πi (Ui (q̂i, 1)). This shows that the
chosen values also satisfy equation (6), for each i.



































such that, for each i ∈ I,
y
(i)
















Recalling equations (4) and (5), it only remains to show that such values t(i) exist, so that
the quadruple is well-defined. This is clearly true when each ti is finite, and the following
three steps prove it also for the case that ti = ∞ (for some i).
Step 1: For any t, φi (vi, t) > 0. From equation (4) it follows that vi ≥ ui (1 − πj (Uj (1, 1))) >
ui (0), since πj (Uj (q, t + 1)) ≤ πj (Uj (1, 1)) < 1 for all (q, t) ∈ Aj due to j’s impatience.
Using identity vi ≡ ui (φi (vi, 0)), vi > ui (0) is equivalent to φi (vi, 0) > 0, and the claim
follows from the non-decreasingness of φi (u, ·) for any u ∈ ui ([0, 1]).
Step 2: For any t ≤ ti, Ui (φi (vi, t) , t) = vi. Since this holds true for t = 0 by definition,
consider it for 0 < t ≤ ti and note that it suffices to show that φi (vi, t) < 1 (recall the
definiton of φi): from equation (6), κi (t, vi, vj) ≤ 1, and using that φj (vj, t − 1) > 0 from
step 1, this implies φi (vi, t) < 1.
Step 3: There exists a finite t̄i such that wi = min
{
Ui (φi (vi, t) , t + 1) |t ∈ T, t ≤ t̄i
}
.
Since we can simply set t̄i = ti if ti is finite, consider the case of ti = ∞ and distinguish
the two possible cases according to impatience property (3.c). Suppose first that player i’s
preferences satisfy limt→∞ Ui (1, t) ≤ ui (0). Since vi > ui (0) from step 1, there then exists
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a finite delay t̂ such that t ≥ t̂ implies Ui (1, t) < vi, and hence Ui (φi (vi, t) , t) < vi, which
contradicts step 2. The alternative case is that there exists a finite delay t̂ such that t ≥ t̂










, t̂ + 1
)
for all
such t, which proves the claim upon setting t̄1 = t̂.
Statement and proof of the next lemma use the following definition: for any values
















1 − πj (wj) t = 0


























⊆ Ai (v1, w1, v2, w2) ⊆ A
∗
i ,
and the following equalities hold true:
vi = min {Ui (q, t) | (q, t) ∈ Ai (v1, w1, v2, w2)}
wi = min {Ui (q, t + 1) | (q, t) ∈ Ai (v1, w1, v2, w2)}
ti = sup {t ∈ T |∃q ∈ [0, 1] , (q, t) ∈ Ai (v1, w1, v2, w2)} .
Proof. The following observation, for each i, will be helpful:
vi > max {ui (0) , wi} . (16)
Since vi > ui (0) was established in step 1 of lemma 5, it only remains to prove that vi > wi:
this follows from equation (5), implying wi ≤ Ui (φi (vi, 0) , 1), because φi (vi, 0) > 0 and i is
impatient.








and note that equation (13) implies that
q̂i = 1 − φj (vj, 0) . (17)





is a play of game Gi, for each i. To
simplify notation, let i = 1, which is without loss of generality. There is nothing to check if
t(1) = 0, so consider the case of t(1) > 0. This implies that t1 > 0 and hence κ1 (1, v1, v2) ≤ 1;
using that φ2 (v2, 0) > 0 by (16), we obtain φ1 (v1, 1) < 1, which implies φ1 (v1, 0) < 1,
and hence, via equation (4) (for i = 1), q̂2 > 0. While necessary for any t
(1) > 0, this is
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sufficient to prove the claim for t(1) = 1. Suppose then t(1) > 1; this implies t1 > 1 and hence
κ1 (2, v1, v2) ≤ 1. Using φ1 (v1, 2) > 0 from combining (16) with the non-decreasingness of
φ1 (u, ·), this in turn implies that φ2 (v2, 0) < 1, from which q̂1 > 0 follows via equation (4)
(for i = 2).
Since any immediate-agreement outcome defines a play, it immediately follows from the











is a quadruple of plays. I

















































∈ Ai (v1, w1, v2, w2). Again, only to simplify notation,






and Â1 ≡ A1 (v1, w1, v2, w2).
First, consider immediate-agreement outcomes (x̂, 0); αQ,1 (x̂, 0) is a play for any
division x̂, and it remains to show that there is no profitable deviation from this play under
σ̂ if and only if (x̂1, 0) ∈ Â1. Player 2’s accepting all offers q ≥ x̂2 is optimal if and
only if x̂2 ≥ π2 (w2), because deviantly rejecting such an offer would trigger her respondent




and associated rejection value w2;
her rejecting all other offers is optimal if and only if x̂2 ≤ q̂2 because non-deviantly rejecting





and associated rejection value U2 (1 − π1 (w1) , 1); using equation (17),
x̂2 ≤ q̂2 is equivalent to φ1 (v1, 0) ≤ x̂1. To summarize, in terms of player 1’s share in x̂,
player 2’s response rule is optimal if and only if φ1 (v1, 0) ≤ x̂1 ≤ 1−π2 (w2); this is equivalent
to (x̂1, 0) ∈ Â1.
Given player 2 optimally accepts with threshold x̂2, this is the lowest immediately ac-
cepted offer, and there is no profitable deviation for player 1 if and only if u1 (x̂1) ≥
U1 (π1 (w1) , 1), because any deviation to a rejected offer triggers her proposer punishment




and associated rejection value U1 (π1 (w1) , 1); in-
equality (16) implies φ1 (v1, 0) > π1 (w1), whereby v1 ≥ U1 (π1 (w1) , 1) from player 1’s im-
patience, and there is no profitable deviation for proposing player 1 whenever there is none
for responding player 2. Hence, there is no profitable deviation from αQ,1 (x̂, 0) if and only
if (x̂1, 0) ∈ Â1.
Next, consider once delayed agreement outcomes (x̂, 1); αQ,1 (x̂, 1) is a play if and
only if q̂2 > 0. Observe that q̂2 = 0 is equivalent to φ1 (v1, 0) = 1, by equation (17), and
jointly with inequality (16) (for i = 2), this would indeed mean that Â1 contains no delayed
agreements at all. Hence it remains to establish the claim for this case under the assumption
that q̂2 > 0.
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Regarding the second round on the path, the above finding for the case of immediate-
agreement outcomes—by mere relabeling—shows that there are then no profitable one-stage
deviations if and only if φ2 (v2, 0) ≤ x̂2 ≤ 1 − π1 (w1). In terms of player 1’s share this is
equivalent to
π1 (w1) ≤ x̂1 ≤ 1 − φ2 (v2, 0) .
In the first round σ̂ specifies that player 2 respond to offers by accepting with threshold
q̂2. Accepting offers q ≥ q̂2 is optimal if and only if accepting offer q̂2 is optimal, i.e. if



















= w2 from equation (14),
and w2 ≤ U2 (φ2 (v2, 0) , 1) from equation (5); recalling equation (17), if acceptance were
not optimal, then u2 (1 − φ1 (v1, 0)) < U2 (φ2 (v2, 0) , 1), which would imply that φ2 (v2, 0) +
φ1 (v1, 0) > 1 and there would be no delayed agreement in Â1.




and is optimal by construction, since q̂2 > 0 implies that u2 (q̂2) = U2 (1 − π1 (w1) , 1)
is the associated rejection value. Rejecting the zero offer specified for the proposer in this
round is optimal if and only if u2 (0) ≤ U2 (x̂2, 1); either u2 (0) ≤ U2 (1, 1), in which case
u2 (0) ≤ U2 (x̂2, 1) is equivalent to x̂1 ≤ 1 − φ2 (u2 (0) , 1), or u2 (0) > U2 (1, 1), in which
case φ2 (u2 (0) , 1) = 1 together with inequality (16) (for i = 1) implies that Â1 contains no
delayed agreements.
By equation (17), the initial proposer 1 can obtain at most the value v1 from making a de-
viant accepted offer q ≥ q̂2; making a deviant rejected offer q < q̂2 yields value U1 (π1 (w1) , 1),
which is no greater than v1 due to inequality (16); hence making her supposed (rejected) offer
of a zero share is optimal if and only if v1 ≤ U1 (x̂1, 1). This is equivalent to x̂1 ≥ φ1 (v1, 1)
unless v1 > U1 (φ1 (v1, 1) , 1); however, the latter would imply φ1 (v1, 1) = 1 and together with
inequality (16) (for i = 2) would yield that Â1 contains no delayed-agreement outcomes. In
summary of this case for q̂2 > 0, using that π1 (w1) < φ1 (v1, 1) from inequality (16), and
noting that min {1 − φ2 (v2, 0) , 1 − φ2 (u2 (0) , 1)} equals 1 − max {φ2 (v2, 0) , φ2 (u2 (0) , 1)},
we obtain there is no profitable deviation if and only if (x̂1, 1) ∈ Â1.









is a play if and only if q̂1 · q̂2 > 0. From the previous case we know that if
q̂2 = 0 then Â1 would not contain any delayed agreement; now note that q̂1 = 0 is equivalent
to φ2 (v2, 0) = 1, by equation (17), and in combination with inequality (16) (for i = 1) would
imply that Â1 contains no agreements delayed by more than one period. Hence it remains
to establish the claim for this case under the assumption that q̂1 · q̂2 > 0.




, which is round t̂+1, we can use the previous findings
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π1 (w1) ≤ x̂1 ≤ 1 − φ2 (v2, 0) t̂ odd
φ1 (v1, 0) ≤ x̂1 ≤ 1 − π2 (w2) t̂ even
.




for any round n < t̂ + 1, in which player P makes an of-
fer to player R. Optimality of R’s response rule is characterized in a manner similar to
optimality of initial respondent 2’s response rule when we considered agreement-outcomes
with one round of delay; it is therefore characterized by uR (0) ≤ UR
(





x̂R, t̂ + 1 − n
)
is non-decreasing in n, this yields only two restrictions, namely those




and u1 (0) ≤
U1
(
x̂1, t̂ − 1
)
, respectively. These two inequalities are equivalent to
φ1
(
u1 (0) , t̂ − 1
)
≤ x̂1 ≤ 1 − φ2
(
u2 (0) , t̂
)




and u1 (0) ≤ U1
(
1, t̂ − 1
)
hold true; otherwise, however,
Â1 contains no outcome that has agreement delayed by t̂ periods.
Again, similar to optimality for initial proposer 1 when we considered one round of
delay, proposer P ’s zero offer is here optimal if and only if vP ≤ UP
(





x̂P , t̂ + 1 − n
)
is non-decreasing in n, this yields only two restrictions, namely those for




and v2 ≤ U2
(
x̂2, t̂ − 1
)
,





≤ x̂1 ≤ 1 − φ2
(
v2, t̂ − 1
)




and v2 ≤ U2
(
1, t̂ − 1
)
hold true; otherwise, however, Â1





at least as large as any of π1 (w1), φ1 (v1, 0) or φ1
(
u1 (0) , t̂ − 1
)
, due to 1’s impatience and
inequality (16); moreover, also φ2
(
v2, t̂ − 1
)
is at least as large as both φ2 (v2, 0) and π2 (w2)
due to 2’s impatience and inequality (16). Hence we can summarize this case for q̂1 · q̂2 > 0

















u2 (0) , t̂
)}
,


















⊆ Ai (v1, w1, v2, w2) ⊆
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A∗i , and the lemma’s claimed equations are easily verified.
Lemma 7. The following relationships hold true for each i ∈ I:
ṽi = ui (1 − πj (Uj (1 − πi (w̃i) , 1))) (18)
w̃i ≥ inf {Ui (φi (ṽi, t) , t + 1) |t ∈ T, t ≤ t
∗
i } (19)
t∗i ≤ sup {t ∈ T |κi (t, ṽi, ṽj) ≤ 1} (20)
Proof. First, observe that, for each i,
(q, t) ∈ A∗i ⇒ (1 − πi (Ui (q, t + 1)) , 0) ∈ A
∗
j . (21)
Let σ be an equilibrium of game Gi which supports i’s personal outcome (q, t), denote the
share 1−πi (Ui (q, t + 1)) by q̂ and the division such that j’s share equals q̂ by x̂. The strategy
profile σ̂ in game Gj such that σ̂ (h
0) = (x̂, Xi,q̂) and σ̂ (x, h) = σ (h) for any division x and
history h, is an equilibrium supporting j’s personal outcome (1 − q̂, 0): following any initial
rejection, σ̂ specifies equilibrium σ, which induces personal outcome (q, t) for player i and
thus implies that the initial response rule of accepting with threshold q̂ is optimal for i; the
initial proposer j best-responds by offering this share, because this is the lowest accepted
offer and, moreover, satisfies uj (1 − q̂) ≥ Uj (1 − q, t + 1), due to q̂ ≤ q, which follows from
i’s impatience, together with the desirability and impatience properties of j’s preferences.
Using this observation, I will now prove all three conditions (18)-(20) for the case of
i = 1; mere relabeling yields them for i = 2.
To show that the pair (ṽ1, w̃1) satisfies equation (18), combine (21) (for i = 2) with the
fact that any equilibrium of game G1 must have the initial respondent 2 accept all offers
greater than sup {π2 (U2 (q, t + 1)) | (q, t) ∈ A
∗
2}, to obtain
ṽ1 = u1 (1 − sup {π2 (U2 (q, t + 1)) | (q, t) ∈ A
∗
2}) .
It then remains to prove that π2 (U2 (1 − π1 (w̃1) , 1)) = sup {π2 (U2 (q, t + 1)) | (q, t) ∈ A
∗
2}.
For this, also combine (21) (now for i = 1) with the fact that any equilibrium of G2 must
have the initial respondent 1 reject all offers less than π1 (w̃1), which yields that
1 − π1 (w̃1) = sup {q ∈ [0, 1] | (q, 0) ∈ A
∗
2} .
Now observe that any (q, t) ∈ A∗2 with t > 0 satisfies U1 (1 − q, t) ≥ w̃1, which implies
1 − q ≥ π1 (U1 (1 − q, t)) ≥ π1 (w̃1) by 1’s impatience and the non-decreasingness of π1, and
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therefore
π2 (U2 (q, t + 1)) ≤ π2 (U2 (1 − π1 (w̃1) , t + 1)) ≤ π2 (U2 (1 − π1 (w̃1) , 1))
by the desirability and impatience properties of 2’s preferences, together with the non-
decreasingness of π2.
Regarding the proof that (ṽ1, w̃1, t
∗
1) satisfies inequality (19), simply note that (q, t) ∈ A
∗
1
implies U1 (q, t) ≥ ṽ1 by the definition of ṽ1, and thus q ≥ φ1 (ṽ1, t); the claim then follows
from the desirability property of 1’s preferences.39
Inequality (20) certainly holds true if t∗1 = 0; for the case of t
∗
1 > 0, note that (q, t) ∈
A∗1 implies both U1 (q, t) ≥ ṽ1 and U2 (1 − q, t) ≥ u2 (0). These two inequalities imply,
respectively, that q ≥ φ1 (ṽ1, t) and 1 − q ≥ φ2 (u2 (0) , t). Moreover, if (q, t) ∈ A
∗
1 with t > 0
also implies that (q, t − 1) ∈ A∗2, hence U2 (1 − q, t − 1) ≥ ṽ2, and thus 1 − q ≥ φ2 (ṽ2, t − 1).
Altogether, for any t > 0 there exists a share q such that (q, t) ∈ A∗1 only if κ1 (t, ṽ1, ṽ2) ≤ 1,
concluding the proof.
Lemma 8. There exist values (vi, wi, ti)i∈I ∈ E such that vi ≤ ṽi, wi ≤ w̃i and ti ≥ t
∗
i for
both i ∈ I.








2) ≡ (w̃1, w̃2) and, for any
n ∈ N and each i,
vni ≡ ui (1 − πj (Uj (1 − πi (w
n
i ) , 1)))
tni ≡ sup
{
t ∈ T |κi
(






wn+1i ≡ inf {Ui (φi (v
n
i , t) , t + 1) |t ∈ T, t ≤ t
n
i } .













and tn+1i ≥ t
n







a limit in E.
The first step is to prove that the sequence (wn1 , w
n
2 ) converges: since each component
sequence wni is non-increasing and bounded from below by Ui (0, ∞) ∈ R, it converges.
Denoting this limit by (ŵ1, ŵ2), the continuity properties of the functions involved imply the
39Under the weakening of desirability suggested in fn. 10, the observation ṽ1 > u1 (0) from (16) means that
no equilibrium delay t can be such that player 1 does not care about her share: otherwise, there would exist
(q, t) ∈ A∗1 with U1 (q, t) = U1 (0, t), but U1 (0, t) ≤ u1 (0) by impatience; hence U1 (q, t) < ṽ1, a contradiction.
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following convergence properties of the sequences vni and t
n
i , for each i:
vni → ui (1 − πj (Uj (1 − πi (ŵi) , 1))) ≡ v̂i








Proof. Lemma 6 implies that E’s being a singleton is necessary for equilibrium uniqueness.
Concerning its sufficiency, the proof of lemma 4 shows that whenever E is a singleton,




i )i∈I equals (ui (q̂i) , Ui (q̂i, 1) , 0)i∈I , for q̂1 the unique fixed point
of f1 and q̂2 ≡ 1 − π1 (U1 (q̂1, 1)). Characterization theorem 1 then implies that each A
∗
i
equals the singleton {(q̂i, 0)}. Consider then any round in which player P makes an offer to
responding player R: since any equilibrium has the outcome that offer q̂P is accepted, it must
be that P indeed offers q̂P , and that R accepts this offer. Since any equilibrium has the same
continuation outcome with R’s associated rejection value equal to UR (q̂R, 1), any optimal
response rule must have R accept any offer q > πR (UR (q̂R, 1)) as well as reject any offer
q < πR (UR (q̂R, 1)). This pins down a unique equilibrium that is, moreover, stationary.
A.5 Lemma 3
This lemma will be proven based on the following characterization of stationary equilibrium,
which establishes a one-to-one relationship between stationary equilibria and fixed points of
f1 (defined by equation (12) to prove lemma 4, as part of theorem 1). Note that in terms
of the players’ impatience (3.) the characterization of stationary equilibrium relies only on
property (3.b), players’ attitudes to delay beyond a single (first) period are irrelevant.



































A stationary equilibrium exists, and it is unique if and only if f1has a unique fixed point.
Proof. First, note that any equilibrium, hence any stationary equilibrium, has agreement,









. Because this outcome
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obtains irrespective of play in the initial round of G1, responding player 2 must accept any





























2 = 0. In case of (i) there exist









































by impatience property (3.b) and desirability of player 1’s preferences, applied in this se-
quence. In case of (ii), impatience property (3.b) together with continuity of player 1’s
preferences imply existence of ǫ > 0 such that u1 (1 − ǫ) > U1 (1, 1). In any case player 1 can
therefore propose immediately accepted divisions that yield a value greater than that from
proposing x(1), contradicting equilibrium. After a symmetric argument, it is then proven
that x(i) ∈ Y (j) for both i ∈ I.
Given this immediate-agreement property of stationary equilibrium, by desirability, (i)








as well as reject








, and (ii) there cannot exist a proposal x by player i with xi > x
(i)
i
such that x ∈ Y (j), whereby
x
(i)













and substituting the expression for x
(2)











necessity. Sufficiency is easily verified, and its proof omitted here.
Existence of a fixed point of f1 and hence stationary equilibrium is established by the
proof of lemma 4, and the characterization shows that there are as many distinct stationary
equilibria as there are fixed points of f1.
Lemma 3 follows from combining the above characterization with the next result.
Lemma 10. If both players’ preferences exhibit immediacy, then f1 has a unique fixed point.
Proof. Suppose that player i’s preferences exhibit immediacy, take any share q and any
ǫ > 0 such that q + ǫ ≤ 1, and consider various possible cases to establish that li (q) ≡
q − πi (Ui (q, 1)) is increasing. First, if Ui (q + ǫ, 1) ≤ ui (0), then also Ui (q, 1) ≤ ui (0) and
li (q) = q < q + ǫ = li (q + ǫ). Second, if Ui (q, 1) ≤ ui (0) < Ui (q + ǫ, 1), then continuity
and impatience imply existence of a share q′ ∈ [q, q + ǫ) such that Ui (q
′, 1) = ui (0); letting
ǫ′ ≡ q +ǫ−q′, immediacy implies ui (ǫ
′) > Ui (q
′ + ǫ′, 1) ≡ Ui (q + ǫ, 1), and hence li (q + ǫ) >
q + ǫ − ǫ′ ≥ q = li (q). Finally, if ui (0) < Ui (q, 1), then continuity and impatience imply
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existence of a share q′ ∈ (0, q) such that ui (q
′) = Ui (q, 1); immediacy implies ui (q
′ + ǫ) >
Ui (q + ǫ, 1), and hence li (q + ǫ) > q + ǫ − (q
′ + ǫ) = li (q).
Consider then the following difference:
q − f1 (q) = q − 1 + π2 (U2 (1 − π1 (U1 (q, 1)) , 1))
= [q − π1 (U1 (q, 1))] − [(1 − π1 (U1 (q, 1))) − π2 (U2 (1 − π1 (U1 (q, 1)) , 1))] .
≡ l1 (q) − l2 (1 − π1 (U1 (q, 1))) .
If li is increasing for both i, then l1 is increasing in q and l2 is increasing in 1 − π1 (U1 (q, 1)).
Since 1 − π1 (U1 (q, 1)) is non-increasing in q, overall the two terms’ difference is increasing
in q, and q − f1 (q) has at most one root; by existence of a fixed point, established earlier, it
has exactly one.
A.6 Proposition 1
Proof. As a first step, I will show the following: if w∗i = Ui (φi (v
∗
i , 0) , 1) for both i ∈ I,





such that xR,ii = φi (v
∗
i , 0) is an optimal respondent punishment




such that xP,ii = πi (Ui (φi (v
∗
i , 0) , 1)). Using equation (4),
φi (v
∗
i , 0) = 1 − πj (Uj (1 − πi (Ui (φi (v
∗
i , 0) , 1)) , 1))
= fi (φi (v
∗
i , 0)) ,












are the two players’ respective proposer shares in one particular stationary equilibrium. If
















such that xR,11 = x
P,2




2 = 1 − π1 (U1 (q̂1, 1)) for q̂1 = φ1 (v
∗
1, 0) the unique







(ui (q̂i) , Ui (q̂i, 1) , 0)i∈I , and A
∗
i = {(q̂i, 0)}, so uniqueness of equilibrium follows from the
argument in the proof of corollary 1. This proves sufficiency. Necessity holds trivially.
The second step shows that w∗i = Ui (φi (v
∗
i , 0) , 1) follows whenever a player i’s preferences
exhibit a weak present bias. This establishes the proposition, because under immediacy
stationary equilibrium is indeed unique. The proof of lemma 5 and theorem 1 imply a finite









where Ui (φi (v
∗
i , t) , t) = v
∗
i holds true for any t ≤ t̄i. A weak present bias then implies
that Ui (φi (v
∗
i , 0) , 1) ≤ Ui (φi (v
∗
i , t) , t + 1) for all such t, and hence w
∗
i = Ui (φi (v
∗
i , 0) , 1),
proving the claim.
A.7 Proposition 2





with t̂ > 0 is an equilibrium outcome of game G1; the case of game G2 follows













u2 (0) , t̂
)}
< 1. (22)
For every round n ≤ t̂ + 1, define each player i’s reservation share for the rejection value




x̂i, t̂ + 1 − n
))
.
The inequalities in (22) imply ui (π
n
i ) = Ui
(




x̂i, t̂ + 1 − n
)
≥
ui (0), and the stronger impatience property assumed in the proposition yields that π
n
i is
increasing, since x̂i > 0.
Define a play as follows: in round 1, player 1 offers a share of b11 = 0, and player 2 accepts
with threshold 1 − b12 such that b
1
2 = φ1 (v
∗
1, 0); in round n such that 1 < n < t̂ + 1, player








and player R (n) accepts with threshold










, with the sole exception that b21 = φ2 (v
∗
2, 0);
in round n = t̂ + 1, player P (n) offers a share bnP (n) = x̂R(n) and player R (n) accepts with
threshold 1 − bnR(n) such that b
n
R(n) = x̂P (n).
First, verify that each sequence (bni )
t̂+1




j : this is true for




j , and if it is true for n − 1 ≥ 1 such that n < t̂ + 1, it is true








< πnj < π
n+1
j . Second, observe that b
n
P (n) < 1 − b
n
R(n) for
all n < t̂ + 1: since πn1 + π
n




j ; hence this indeed





The final step is to show that this defines equilibrium play. Taken then any strategy
profile σ of game G1 such that 〈σ〉 equals the above play (clearly, one exists) and define the

















is an OPC, as in proposition
4, part (i). Hence 〈σ̂〉 = 〈σ〉 and σ̂ is an equilibrium if and only if there are no profitable
one-stage deviations from its play 〈σ̂〉.
Consider then any round n ≤ t̂ + 1 of play 〈σ̂〉. Rejecting an offer q ≥ 1 − bnR(n) is no
better than accepting it for R (n), since it yields the minimal credible rejection value w∗R(n)
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due to optimal punishment, but
w∗R(n) ≤ UR(n)
(

















x̂, t̂ − n
)
is a continuation equilibrium outcome (by assumption), that πn1 +π
n
2 ≤ 1
and that bnR(n) ≤ π
n
P (n); accepting an offer q < 1 − b
n
R(n) such that q 6= b
n

























, by construction, and the-
orem 1, which shows that continuation with optimal punishment of a proposing player i has
rejection value Uj (1 − πi (w
∗
i ) , 1) for respondent j, and that this is equal to uj (1 − φi (v
∗
i , 0));
finally, accepting offer q = bnP (n) < 1 − b
n
R(n), which can only be the case for n < t̂ + 1, is no











x̂R(n), t̂ + 1 − n
)
.
Consider then the proposer’s incentives, given the respondent’s behavior and punishments
for deviations: the minimal offer which the respondent accepts equals bnR(n), which is no











x̂P (n), t̂ + 1 − n
)
,
so there is no profitable deviation to any (alternative) accepted offer; any other deviant offer








which is no greater than v∗P (n) by theorem 1,
and since UP (n)
(
x̂P (n), t̂ + 1 − n
)




is an equilibrium outcome, there is
no profitable deviation to a rejected offer either.
A.8 Proposition 3
Proof. Omitting player indices due to symmetry, by theorem 1, if there exists an equilibrium
with agreement delayed t > 0 periods, then κ (t, v∗, v∗) ≤ 1. This implies that φ (v∗, t′) ≤ 1
2
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for all t′ < t, since
κ (t, v∗, v∗) ≤ 1 ⇔ φ (v∗, t)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥φ(v∗,t−1)














∈ A∗ follows for all t′ < t.
B Supplementary Material
B.1 Multiplicity and Delay under Weak Present Bias
Supplementing section 5.2.2, I here present two examples of how violations of immediacy
result in multiplicity and, possibly, also delay. The first is one of dynamically consistent
preferences (ED) and was presented already by Rubinstein (1982, concl. I). To the best of
my knowledge, its set of equilibria has not yet been explicitly characterized, however.
Example 4. Let the two parties’ preferences be given by Ui (q, t) = q − ct, for c ∈ (0, 1).
Due to preference symmetry, player indices are omitted in what follows. The preferences are
covered by assumption 1 once U (0, ∞) ≡ −∞ is specified; in particular, impatience property
(3.c) is satisfied: U (1, t) tends to minus infinity, whereas u (0) = 0.40 In the assumed absence
of uncertainty, they actually satisfy ED, albeit with “strongly” convex instantaneous utility:
U (q, t) = ln (δtu (q)) for δ ≡ exp (−c) and u (q) ≡ exp (q). Hence they exhibit a weak present
bias but violate immediacy (increasing shares by the same amount leaves indifferent).41
This results in a multiplicity of stationary equilibrium: any q ∈ [c, 1] is a proposer’s
equilibrium share in some stationary equilibrium (with immediate agreement, of course).
Applying the characterization of theorem 1, v∗ = c and w∗ = 0, where both of these minimal
proposer and rejection values correspond to a player’s least preferred stationary equilibrium.
Using these two least preferred stationary equilibria as optimal punishments, non-stationary
delay equilibria can be constructed, and equation (6) offers a formula to compute the maximal
40U violates the requirement of assumption 1 that U (0, ∞) ∈ R, but the positive monotonic transformation
exp (U) represents the same preferences and satisfies also this property.
41One may interpret such preferences as there being a cost to bargaining. To justify the non-negativity
of each player’s share in any proposal, assume then that players have an “outside option” of leaving the
bargaining table forever, which is equivalent to obtaining a zero share immediately.
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such delay for any c ∈ (0, 1):





(2t + 1) c t ≤ 1−c
c
1 + ct 1−c
c




























For instance, if c = 1
100
, so that the cost per bargaining round equals one percent of the
surplus per player, then the maximal equilibrium delay is 49 periods, with an associated
efficiency loss of 98 percent of the surplus. To determine the values of c for which de-
layed agreement is an equilibrium outcome, simply solve κ (1, c, c) ≤ 1 for c, yielding
c ≤ 1
3
. The set of equilibrium divisions with a given delay t ≤ t∗ in game G1 equals
{x ∈ X|c + ct ≤ x1 ≤ 1 − ct} and is monotonically shrinking in t.
The second example is one of dynamically inconsistent preferences (with an actual present
bias) that are non-separable, following the magnitude-effects model of Noor (2011).
Example 5. Let the two parties’ preferences be symmetrically given by Ui (q, t) = δ (q)
t·u (q)
with δ (q) = 0.5 + 0.49 · q0.5 and u (q) = q0.5.
While both Ui (q, 0) = q
0.5 and Ui (q, 1) = 0.5 ·q
0.5 +0.49 ·q are concave, these preferences
violate immediacy; e.g., once delayed share q′ = 0.75 is indifferent to immediate share
q ≈ 0.64, but upon increasing both by ǫ = 0.05 the delayed one is preferred. Equations
(4) and (5) for ti = 0 have here three solutions, all of which correspond to a (symmetric)
stationary equilibrium, with respective proposer shares 0.04, 0.57 and 0.98. (All numbers
are rounded.) These different stationary equilibria can be used as (non-stationary) threats
to support further equilibrium outcomes.
Indeed, given weak present bias (see footnote 34), the extreme stationary equilibria deliver
the extreme equilibrium values; hence, they constitute optimal punishments supporting all
equilibrium outcomes. Here the smallest stationary-equilibrium proposer share equals 0.04,
and any immediate division with the initial proposer’s share between this smallest amount
and the largest stationary share of 0.98 can be supported. For any such division x, it can
easily be verified that the following is an equilibrium: player 1 initially proposes division
x, player 2 accepts with threshold x2, and in case of a rejection, (i) if the initial offer was
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less than x2, the players continue with the stationary equilibrium in which player 2, as the
proposer of round 2, receives the largest credible share of 0.98, and (ii) if the initial offer
was at least x2, the players continue with the stationary equilibrium in which player 2, as
the proposer of round 2, receives the smallest credible share of 0.04.
Computing all other equilibrium outcomes is straightforward using the indifference prop-
erty (due to preference symmetry, player indices are omitted in what follows): for a single
period of delay, the delayed share indifferent to the smallest immediate share of 0.04 equals
0.10, and the surplus cost κ of this delay therefore equals 0.04 + 0.10 = 0.14, which is fea-
sible. Hence, any once-delayed division with the initial proposer’s share between 0.10 and
1 − 0.04 = 0.96 can be supported. Let player 2 be the initial proposer and take any such
division x; it can easily be verified that the following is an equilibrium: player 2 initially
demands the entire surplus (offers zero), player 1 accepts with threshold 0.96, and in case
of a rejection, (i) if the initial offer was zero, then the players continue with the immediate-
agreement equilibrium described above for division x, and (ii) if the initial offer was positive,
then the players continue with the stationary equilibrium in which player 1, as the proposer
of round 2, receives the largest credible share of 0.98.
Continuing this way until the surplus cost of the delay becomes infeasible—i.e., κ > 1—
we can describe the set of equilibrium divisions for any feasible delay. The maximal delay
t∗ equals seven rounds, and the set of equilibrium divisions with this delay equals that of all
divisions with the initial proposer’s share between 0.48 and 1 − 0.43 = 0.57.
B.2 Unbounded Equilibrium Delay
The following example slightly modifies example 3 to exhibit unbounded equilibrium delay.






δt t ≤ τ
γδτ+1 t > τ
, (δ, γ) ∈ (0, 1)2 and τ > 0.
Due to preference symmetry, the player subscript is again omitted in what follows.
The difference to example 3 is that delays beyond horizon τ + 1 are not discounted.
Observe, however, that ∆ (t) equals δ for all t ≤ τ and γδ for all t > τ , exactly as in example
3. Hence, whenever there is an equilibrium in which agreement is delayed by τ periods,
v∗ = 1−δ
1−γδ2
and w∗ = γδv∗, as was found there.
The absence of discounting beyond a delay of τ +1 periods implies that equilibrium delay
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Figure 3: Graphs regarding unbounded equilibrium delay in example 3. The panel on the left
shows the parametric regions (δ, γ) such that equilibrium delay is unbounded for three given
values of τ , which are 1 (blue, brown and green), 25 (brown and green) and 1000 (green).
The panel on the right illustrates how the respective parametric regions for existence of
delay equilibria (superset, bounded by solid line) and unbounded equilibrium delay (subset,
bounded by dashed line) are related for the case of τ = 50.
is unbounded if and only if 1 ≥ κ (τ + 2, v∗, v∗) = 2 v
∗
γδτ+1








after substituting for v∗. Notice that this inequality is more stringent than example 3’s
inequality (8), which shows when delay equilibria exist; in particular, γ > 0 is here re-
quired. Indeed, γ might be too low: despite existence of an equilibrium with delay τ , which
fully determines the optimal punishments, proposing players would then require too large
a compensation for longer delays, as those would involve additional discounting through γ.
Nonetheless, for any given τ > 0 and γ < 1, there again exist large enough values of δ such
that also inequality (23) is satisfied, with the set of parameters γ and τ such that equilibrium
delay is unbounded expanding as δ increases. Figure 3 illustrates this.
A-22
